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Policy contexts and diversity over the life course and across generations

# Report: Country-Specific Case Studies on Partnership Dynamics Among Immigrants and Their Descendants

# Part 1

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# Introduction

# Country-Specific Case Studies on Partnership Dynamics Among Immigrants and Their Descendants

#### Hill Kulu

This report consists of six case studies on partnership trajectories among immigrants and their descendants by comparing their patterns to those of the 'native' population. The countries that are included in the analysis are Estonia, France, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Sweden and Spain. All of the case studies use large-scale longitudinal data and apply event-history analysis. The analysis shows significant differences in partnership formation and dissolution between immigrants, their descendants and the 'native' population in all six countries. Immigrants from non-European countries are more likely to follow the 'traditional' partnership trajectories than natives. Specifically, they have higher marriage rates, lower (premarital) cohabitation levels and are less likely to separate. These differences largely persist after individuals' socio-demographic characteristics are controlled. Still, in comparison to 'natives', 'modern' family formation patterns dominate among some non-European immigrant groups (e.g., Caribbeans in the UK and Latin Americans in Spain). This result may be due to specific patterns in the region of origin (Caribbean countries) or the prevalence of traditional patterns in the destination country (Spain).

Overall, the analysis supports the importance of the socialisation environment in shaping immigrants' partnership trajectories, although further research is needed to determine the degree to which their patterns are similar to those in the country of origin. The partnership patterns of the descendants of immigrants are 'in-between'. For some groups, these patterns resemble those of their parents.

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For others, the patterns resemble those of the 'native' population, supporting the idea that both the 'minority subculture' and the 'mainstream society' have an effect on their behaviour. The six case studies provide rich information on the partnership dynamics of various immigrant groups, allowing for preliminary conclusions about the similarities and differences between the countries. A comparative study will follow to explicitly investigate and identify whether and how institutional settings and government policies shape the partnership trajectories of immigrants and their descendants.

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# Family Dynamics Among Immigrants and Their Descendants in Estonia

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#### Abstract:

This case study examines partnership transitions among the migrants and their descendants in Estonia, who mainly originate from the European part of Russia. The study is based on the Estonian Generations and Gender Survey (2004/2005), and the Estonian Family and Fertility Survey (1994/1997) and employs proportional hazards event history models. The results show that new family formation patterns, associated with the Second Demographic Transition, are less prevalent among migrants. The difference between migrants and native Estonians is most pronounced in the mode of partnership formation and outcomes of cohabiting unions. At the same time, the results pertaining to union dissolution do not reveal a systematic difference between migrants and native Estonians. Reflecting the relatively slow integration of migrants, the difference between first- and second-generation immigrants appears limited. The results lend support to socialisation hypothesis and underscore the importance of contextual factors pertaining to both host and origin country.

Keywords: immigrants, second generation, partnership formation, partnership dissolution, Estonia

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#### 1. Introduction

Since the late 1960s, European societies have experienced profound transformations in partnership and childbearing patterns. Family dynamics have become increasingly complex, characterised by decline in marriage, increase in non-marital cohabitation and divorce, postponement of parenthood and reordering of events in the family life course. The contrast with earlier patterns was so large that a new concept — the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) — was introduced by Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa (1986), and further developed by both authors (Van de Kaa 1987; 1994; Lesthaeghe 1995; 2010). Although subjected to criticism on different grounds (Cliquet 1991; Coleman 2004; Perelli-Harris *et al.* 2010), the SDT has proven a useful conceptual framework for the description and analysis of contemporary family and fertility trends in Europe.

The premise of the transition implies that demographic development is a gradual multi-stage process, with leaders and laggards among countries and sub-groups of the population. An extensive literature documents the spread of the SDT across regions and countries of Europe (Andersson & Philipov 2002; Kiernan 2002; Kohler *et al.* 2002; Sobotka 2008a; Neyer *et al.* 2013). However, most of the evidence describing the progress of the SDT pertains to total/majority populations of the countries. In the same period, European societies have experienced large-scale migration flows and witnessed the growing ethnic and cultural heterogeneity of their populations (Coleman 2006; Castles & Miller 2009). In many countries, particularly in Northern and Western Europe, both with a longer history of immigration, children of former labour migrants currently form an increasingly important share of young adults (Sobotka 2008b). In the younger age groups, the second generation dominates among populations of migrant origin (Hernandez *et al.* 2009).

Research in family transitions among migrants has primarily focused on formation (Kalmijn 1998; González-Ferrer 2006; Kalmijn & Van Tubergen 2006; Muttarak & Heath 2010; Sanchez-Dominguey *et al.* 2011) and stability of mixed marriages between natives and migrants (Kalmijn *et al.* 2005; Dribe & Lundh 2011; Feng *et al.* 2012; Smith *et al.* 2012). Although there has been a growing interest in other aspects of family dynamics among migrants and their descendants (Bernhardt *et al.* 2007; Huschek *et al.* 2010; Milewski & Hamel 2010; Zorlu & Mulder 2011), the evidence is relatively limited. We know little about the extent to which the new family behaviours that have emerged in host societies are adopted

by migrants and whether the cross-national diversity in the spread of the SDT applies to migrant populations.

This case study complements the existing literature by analysing family transitions among the migrant population in Estonia<sup>1</sup>. Its contribution is important for several reasons. First, European research in family transitions among migrant populations has focused almost exclusively on Western countries. By adding an East European context, this study contributes to a more comprehensive account of migrant populations in different socio-economic and cultural settings. Second, the early onset of large-scale immigration to Estonia rendered the country with a migrant population that today stretches across several generations; this allows us to investigate children of immigrants and obtain results that can be compared to findings pertaining to the second generation in Northern and Western Europe. Third, the data we use (the pooled data of the Estonian Family and Fertility Survey and Estonian Generations and Gender Survey) provide detailed life history information that offers an opportunity to observe family dynamics of migrants over the life course, including partnership dissolution and repartnering. Finally, we investigate the patterns for women as well as men, which permit us to explore gendered patterns of integration.

The case study consists of five sections. In the next section, we briefly discuss the theoretical approaches to family dynamics among migrants and the empirical findings to date. We then proceed to a description of the Estonian context, which provides a basis for our hypotheses. The following sections explain data sources and methods employed in the study, and present our results on family transitions. The final section includes a summary and a discussion of the findings.

#### 2. Theoretical perspectives and previous findings

Several complementary mechanisms have been proposed to explain how migration interacts with family dynamics when individuals move from one country to another. The majority of the literature on these mechanisms focuses on childbearing among migrants but it seems plausible that similar mechanisms are applicable to family dynamics more generally.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For convenience, migrant origin population is denoted migrant population even though the descendants of immigrants have not migrated from one country to another.

The *socialisation* hypothesis (Andersson 2004; Kulu & Milewski 2007) suggests that the family behaviour of migrants is shaped by values, norms and behavioural patterns to which they have been exposed during childhood. It is assumed that these influences have a lasting impact that is relatively stable during the life course. As a result, international migrants tend to follow family behaviour that is characteristic of their country of origin and not converge to patterns prevailing in the host society. The family life choices of the descendants of migrants are shaped by the society in which they grow up but at the same time they are exposed to their parents' behaviour, values and norms. This renders the second generation in a special position because their family patterns are shaped by both influences. The outcomes in the second generation depend on which influence will eventually prevail.

The *adaptation* hypothesis (Hervitz 1985; Andersson 2004; Andersson & Scott 2005) posits that the family behaviour of migrants will converge toward that of the population of the host society. In contrast to the socialisation hypothesis, the convergence is expected to occur in a medium rather than long-term perspective. The *selectivity* hypothesis (Macisco *et al.* 1970; Hoem 1975) explains the migrants' family behaviour by the fact that people who move from one social environment to another may have particular characteristics that distinguish them from the population at origin. The selectivity hypothesis calls for attention to controlling the compositional differences between migrants, on the one hand, and the sending and receiving populations, on the other hand.

Finally, short-term influences of migration have been described by the *disruption* hypothesis (Carlson 1985; Kulu 2006) and the hypothesis of *interrelation of life events* (Andersson 2004; Kulu 2005; 2006). The underlying assumption of the first hypothesis is that migration is a stressful event that entails significant economic costs, disconnection of social networks, and psychological pressure that may discourage family formation. In contrast, the second hypothesis draws attention to the fact that migration often occurs in close proximity to other life events. Some migrants may move for the purpose of family re-unification and such migrations lead to elevated intensity of childbearing after the move.

Although evidence on family dynamics among migrants is less extensive than that on childbearing, it supports the view that most of the mechanisms described above apply to partnership transitions. Earlier studies on the United States have demonstrated strong effects of selectivity on first union formation. For instance, Landale (1994) showed that the migration

of Puerto Rican women to the United States was a selective process with migrants originating from lower socio-economic strata. The author concluded that the selectivity encouraged early and informal union formation among Puerto Rican immigrants.

Support to the selectivity hypothesis also comes from a more recent study of union formation among migrants to Spain (Trilla *et al.* 2008). The authors found that a major part of differences in partnership patterns between migrants and natives can be explained away by differences in individual and couple characteristics. At the same time, the variation across migrant groups did not wholly disappear after controlling for these differences. The arrivals from Latin America were significantly more likely to opt for cohabitation than native-born Spaniards while the Moroccan immigrants exhibited a lower likelihood. In line with the socialisation hypothesis, the authors attributed these differences to norms and practices that prevail in the countries of origin. Among migrants arriving outside Europe, this usually entails more traditional partnership patterns with marriage holding a stronger position and the transition to first union occurring at a younger age than is common among natives. This has been reported for migrant groups in different countries (Wanner 2002; Østby 2002; De Valk *et al.* 2004; Zorlu & Mulder 2011).

Results for the second generation lend support to both adaptation and socialisation hypotheses. Family behaviour among the descendants of immigrants usually differs from that observed in the first generation but has rarely completely converged with the native population. For instance, the in-between situation of the second generation was portrayed in a study of first partnership formation amongst second-generation Turkish immigrants in France (Milewski & Hamel 2010). The authors concluded that union formation of the descendants of immigrants represents an amalgamation of two cultures, different from that prevailing in the country of origin and mainstream host society. A comparative study on union formation among the descendants of Turkish immigrants by Huschek et al. (2010) suggested that the described situation may not be unique to France; Milewski (2011) has shown that throughout Europe, women of the Turkish second generation enter parenthood at much earlier ages than their native counterparts. Researchers tend to attribute these more traditional patterns to parental influence and cultural factors (De Valk & Liefbroer 2007; Huschek et al. 2010). In addition, these patterns may be reinforced by poorer educational outcomes and labour market prospects among the second generation (Crul & Vermeulen 2006; Heath et al. 2008). Convergence to patterns prevailing in host societies is likely hindered by intermarriage rates

that have been proven lower than initially thought in the second generation (González-Ferrer 2006; Milewski & Hamel 2010).

Research on the descendants of immigrants has revealed that different groups at the same destination do not necessarily exhibit uniform partnership patterns. For instance, Bernhardt *et al.* (2007) reported that the descendants of Polish immigrants to Sweden closely resembled their native counterparts with regard to the levels of cohabitation and timing of union formation; however, young adults of Turkish origin showed much less similarity with native Swedes in their family transitions. Significant variation in family patterns across migrant groups of different origin is also observed in other settings (De Valk *et al.* 2004; Zeng *et al.* 2012). On the other hand, comparative studies on migrants with the same background suggest that the context of receiving countries shapes family behaviour as migrants adapt to the patterns predominant in host societies (Huchek *et al.* 2010; Milewski 2011).

This case study, using evidence from Estonia, offers additions to the two perspectives described above. We mainly focus on the socialisation mechanism, which appears more relevant in analysing the integration of migrants over the long run. To facilitate the formulation of specific hypotheses, the following section briefly outlines the characteristic features of the Estonian context.

#### 3. The Estonian context

#### 3.1. Migration and migrant population in Estonia

Estonia was transformed into an immigration country in the 1940s. Large-scale immigration began shortly after the country was incorporated into the Soviet Union and remained high until the late 1980s (Sakkeus 1994). In the Soviet context, central authorities that brought administrators, military personnel and a large industrial workforce to Estonia directed migration. This was facilitated by employment and housing policies that provided the administration and enterprises with means to attract labour migrants from other regions of the former USSR (Kulu 2003; Kährik 2006). The persistent immigration entailed a major transformation in the population composition. The proportion of the majority population decreased from an estimated 97% in 1945 to 75% in 1959 (the first post-war census), and

further to 62% in 1989 (the last Soviet census).<sup>2</sup> At the end of the 1980s, foreign-borns comprised 26% of the total population and the second generation was estimated at nearly 10%, rendering Estonia with one of the highest shares of migrant population in Europe (Katus *et al.* 2002).

The restoration of Estonia's independence brought the large-scale immigration to an end and resulted in a wave of return migration in the early 1990s (Tammaru & Kulu 2003). The intercensus balance reveals that in 1989–2000 almost 25% of migrants left the country. In the 2000s, the negative net migration continued but the resulting population decrease (–6% among migrant population) appeared smaller than in the period of return migration (Puur *et al.* 2013). The negative net migration in the 1990s and 2000s implies that immigration to Estonia has been relatively limited over the last two decades. Overall, the 2011 census enumerated 22,000 new residents who had settled in the country since 1990 (1.7% of the census population). In 2011, migrants and their descendants constituted 26.4% of the total population, of which the first generation comprised 14.8% and subsequent generations 11.6% (ESA 2013). With regard to ethnic composition, the proportion of the majority population was 69.7%.

The origin of the first-generation migrants mirrors the geography of post-war migration to Estonia. More than 86% of migrants stem from three Slavic republics of the former Soviet Union, with 70% born in Russia, 11% in Ukraine and 6% in Belorussia. Among the remaining countries, Latvia (2%), Kazakhstan (2%) and Finland (1%) have somewhat larger shares. Among the post-1990 arrivals, the origin has become more diverse but the latter group is too small to shape the general pattern. The predominance of Slavic origin is even more pronounced when it comes to ethnic and linguistic characteristics. In 2011, Russians comprised 80%, Ukrainians 7% and Belarusians 4% of the migrant population in Estonia; 92% of non-majority population reported Russian as mother tongue.

A characteristic feature of the migrant population in Estonia is its relatively slow integration to the host society. This is reflected in the limited skills of Estonian language that dates back

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> According to 1934 census, the proportion of ethnic Estonians was 88% and minorities (mainly Russians, Germans, Swedes, Latvians and Jews) comprised 12% of the total population in Estonia. In 1939–1944, under varying circumstances, the country lost 3/4 of its minority population (Katus *et al.* 2000).

<sup>3</sup> The native population has also experienced negative net migration in the 1990s and 2000s. The cumulative reduction of the population due to migration was -1% in 1989–2000 and -1,8% in 2000–2011.

<sup>4</sup> Åmong the 2000–2011 arrivals enumerated in the 2011 census, the share of Russia had decreased to 37% (ESA 2013).

to the period when Russian was the official and main language of inter-ethnic communication in the former Soviet Union. In the late 1980s only 15% of the migrant population residing in the country were fluent in Estonian (Pavlenko 2008). In 2011, still 54% of migrants and their descendants reported that they could not speak Estonian (ESA 2013). The integration is hindered by very high concentration of migrants in certain regions of the country and linguistic division in the educational system (Rannut 2008; Tammaru & Kontuly 2011). There is also evidence of low rates of intermarriage between migrants and native population (Van Ham & Tammaru 2011) and considerable occupational and sectoral segregation in the labour market (Luuk 2009)<sup>5</sup>. However, the situation is gradually changing. Programmes of language immersion have become more widespread in Russian-language schools and in the upper secondary level, 60% of subjects are taught in Estonian. As a consequence of these changes, Estonian language proficiency is higher among younger generations of the migrant population (Lindemann 2013).

#### 3.2. Family-related context in Estonia and the countries of origin

In this section, we describe the family-related contexts of Estonia and Russia. As the demographic profiles of Belorussia and Ukraine bear close similarity with that of Russia, the description extends to an overwhelming majority of migrant population in Estonia.

Historically, Estonia and Russia featured distinct marriage patterns identified by Hajnal (1965). The evidence from family reconstitution studies (Palli 2004) shows that since the late 18<sup>th</sup> century Estonia was characterised by the late and low prevalence marriage that prevailed in the countries west of the Hajnal line running from Trieste to St. Petersburg. In contrast, marriage remained more universal and occurred at younger ages in Russia (Coale *et al.* 1979; Coale & Treadway 1986). Another important distinction between the two countries relates to the onset of demographic modernisation. The findings based on the Princeton European Fertility Project reveal that Russia entered fertility transition about four decades later than Estonia (Katus 1994). It can be assumed that this time-lag made a significant contribution to the intensity of migration to Estonia since Russia and most other regions of the former Soviet

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> In 2000–2012, the difference in employment and unemployment rates between native and migrant population (age groups 15–74) ranged between 1.7–4.7 percentage points and 3.3–10 percentage points respectively (ESA 2013). Net salaries of migrant-origin employees were on average 10–15% lower in 1995–2007 (Leping & Toomet 2008).

<sup>6</sup> The estimated date of 10% decline in marital fertility was 1888 for Estonia and 1927 for the European Russia (Coale 1992).

Union experienced rapid population growth and high migration potential in the aftermath of World War II when Estonia was incorporated into the USSR.

In the post-war decades, the family-formation context in Estonia and in the countries of origin became more similar. In that period, Estonia witnessed a shift towards earlier marriage and lower proportions of never-married (Vikat 1994). Unlike in most countries that experienced the disappearance of the west European marriage pattern, the trend towards earlier marriage did not stop and reverse in the late 1960s or 1970s but persisted until the 1980s in Estonia. In Russia, the traditional pattern of early and almost universal marriage did not markedly change in the post-war decades (Avdeev & Monnier 2000; Vishnevskii 2006). In both countries, early marriage was associated with childbearing at a relatively young age (Katus 2000; Zakharov 2008). Similar patterns were characteristic of most countries of Eastern Europe, upholding the East-West divide in family behaviour (Monnier & Rychtarchikova 1992; Ni Brolchain 1993).

Both in Estonia and in the countries of origin, a major break in the family formation trends occurred in the 1990s when marriage rates turned to rapid decline and the mean age at first marriage started to increase. This was associated with the rapid spread of non-marital cohabitation, which has effectively replaced direct marriage as a pathway to partnership formation. Recent studies have demonstrated that these new trends emerged earlier in Estonia (Hoem *et al.* 2008; Gerber & Berman 2011; Puur *et al.* 2012). Among native Estonians, cohabitation became the dominant pathway to partnership formation in generations that formed their families in the 1970s. Although in Russia the evidence of cohabitation can be traced back to even earlier generations (Zakharov 2008), the turn from direct marriage to cohabitation was completed two decades later than in Estonia, in the late 1990s. The difference in the spread of new family forms is also revealed in the proportion of non-marital births. In Estonia, this measure has reached a level close to 60%, which is comparable to the Northern European forerunners of the Second Demographic Transition. In Russia, the proportion of non-marital births fluctuated between 25–30% in the late 2000s (Eurostat 2013).

With regard to partnership dissolution, both countries have exhibited considerable similarity. Since the middle of the 1960s, when divorce legislation was liberalised in the Soviet Union, divorce rates in both countries increased rapidly and reached top-ranking positions in international comparisons (Council of Europe 2006). Likewise, for both countries the cohort data suggest that the proportion of men and women who experienced divorce increased

sharply in generations born since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century (Katus *et al.* 2002; Scherbov & Van Vianen 2004). The divergence of post-1990 trends — Russia has maintained high divorce rates while Estonia witnessed a decrease — likely reflects a more rapid spread of consensual unions in Estonia as the break-up of the latter is not captured in divorce statistics.

#### 4. Research aim and hypotheses

The main aim of this case study is to analyse the patterns of family dynamics among migrants and their descendants in Estonia, against the background of the native population. The discussion of the mechanisms that shape family transitions among migrants, the review of empirical findings and the context leads us to three hypotheses.

Our first hypothesis (H1) is that new family patterns associated with the Second Demographic Transition tend to be less prevalent among migrant population in Estonia. The hypothesis draws mainly on the socialisation argument according to which the behaviour of migrants mirrors the patterns that are characteristic of their countries of origin. In testing the hypothesis, we do not distinguish between the first generation migrants and their descendants since we assume that the influence of the country of origin extends to both generations.

Our second hypothesis (H2) posits that the difference between native and migrant population varies across family transitions. More specifically, based on the evidence pertaining to the family development in Estonia and the countries of origin, we do expect significant differences to be associated with the pathways of union formation and outcomes of non-marital cohabitation. In contrast, we expect to observe no or limited difference in union dissolution. Similarly, we are not expecting major differences in transition to partnership. We assume that the hypothesised patterns are, at least in part, also characteristic of higher order unions.

Although theoretical models suggest that the second generation grows up under the influence of the host society and adapts to the values of the native population, the second generation may also socialise into immigrant/minority subculture. Considering the relatively slow integration of migrants to the host society in Estonia, our third hypothesis (H3) posits the differences in family behaviour between migrants and their descendants to be relatively

limited. We do expect that the family dynamics of second-generation migrants is more similar to that of the first generation than native Estonians.

#### 5. Data and methods

The data for this study come from the Estonian Generations and Gender Survey (2004/2005), and the Estonian Family and Fertility Survey (women 1994; men 1997). Both surveys collected detailed histories of partnership formation and dissolution. The surveys were based on nationally representative probability samples of the resident population with reduced sampling rate for men. The selection of cases was performed using a single-stage random procedure; the response rates were respectively 70.2% (GGS) and 84.5% (FFS). After merging the two datasets, the combined sample includes 10031 women and 5327 men born in 1924–1983. Further information on the surveys is available from methodological reports and other publications (EKDK 1995; 1999; Katus *et al.* 2008).

In this study we analyse partnership transitions among the migrant population in Estonia. As the overwhelming majority of migrants to Estonia originated from the Slavic republics of the former Soviet Union, we do not distinguish between different subgroups of migrants. Our study population comprises first generation migrants, who were born abroad, and their descendants in the second generation, who were themselves born in Estonia but whose both parents were born outside the country. A small number of ethnic Estonians, who themselves or whose both parents were born outside the country, are considered return migrants and included among the native population.

The partnership transitions analysed in the study include the entry into first union and first marriage, dissolution of first union, and the entry into second union. We distinguish between the entry into union via direct marriage and cohabitation and the outcomes of unions started as non-marital cohabitation. To analyse the abovementioned transitions, we use proportional hazards event history models. Depending on family transition in question, the models are specified as single decrement (union formation and dissolution) or competing risks models (pathways to union formation, cohabitation outcomes). Table 1 presents the number of respondents and family transitions in our study by migrant generation/nativity status.

(Table 1 about here)

Our modelling strategy is straightforward and follows the guidelines for the country case studies of the FamiliesAndSocieties project. For each transition investigated in the study, we estimate a series of main effects models and monitor the change in the effects of independent variable. The first model M1 includes independent variable (migrants status/generation), process time and birth cohort. In the following steps we add controls using a stepwise procedure. In model M2, pregnancy-parity status (childless, pregnant, parent) and various process-specific controls (age of respondent at union formation and type of union in the models of union dissolution, age of respondent at the end of first union in the models of second union formation) are added. In model M3, we add controls on educational attainment (low, secondary, vocational, tertiary) and labour market status (in education, employed, non-employed). Models M4a and M4b include additional controls for time before and after arrival to Estonia (model M4a includes an additional control variable for the arrival in the host country; in model M4b, the time before arrival is omitted). To allow for better comparability across the first and second-generation migrants, model M4c restricts the estimation of M4b to birth cohorts 1940–1979.

To account for time trends in the inter-group differences we estimate interactions between our main independent variable (migrant status/generation) and birth cohort. The interaction models are fitted to family transitions which exhibit the largest contrasts in the main effects models. The results, produced as maximum likelihood estimates of parameter effects, are presented in the form of hazard ratios. To save space, the presentation is limited to main independent variables (full model results are available from the authors).

#### 6. Results

#### 6.1. Formation of first partnership

Table 2 presents the model estimates for the transition to first conjugal union among never-partnered women and men, which were obtained from event history models. The dependent variable in our models is the rate of entry into first partnership. The exposure was measured in months, starting at the age of 15 for the respondent and continued until the entry into first union, or until censoring at the interview or the respondent's 45<sup>th</sup> birthday, whichever event came first.

The comparison between migrants and the native population reveals a difference between the two groups: migrants feature a systematically higher propensity to start partnership than the native Estonians. The difference is statistically significant and it does not fade away following the inclusion of demographic and socio-economic characteristics in the models. Migrant women and men exhibit a similar pattern with elevated risks of partnership formation relative to their native counterparts.

The descriptive measures (available from the authors) suggest that the higher rate of partnership formation characteristic of migrants results from the combination of two features. First, the migrants in Estonia have remarkably low proportions of never-partnered women and men. In the cohorts born before the mid-1960s, which had their union formation largely completed by the time of the GGS data collection, the proportion of never-partnered does not exceed 2–3%. Among the native population, the corresponding percentages are somewhat higher (4–6%). Second, migrants tended to start partnerships at younger ages than the native population. A closer look shows that earlier union formation was more evident in the cohorts born in the 1930s and 1940s. In the following generations, the difference in the timing of first partnership almost disappeared.

A distinction between the first generation of migrants and their descendants shows that the difference form native population is larger in the first generation. The descendants of migrants, women and men alike, exhibit a hazard ratio that falls in between the native population and the first generation. Among women, the differences between the two migrant generations are statistically significant in the final models (M4a-M4c). Among men, plausibly due to a smaller number of male respondents in our sample, not all models reveal a significant difference between the first and second-generation migrants.

#### (Table 2 about here)

Table 2 also presents model estimates for the entry into first marriage. The respondents are followed from age 15 to first marriage (which is not necessarily the first partnership for a given respondent), interview or until censoring at age 45. The models for first marriage provide a basically similar account of the difference between migrant and native respondents. This is, of course, not surprising since for the majority of respondents in our surveys, first

partnership and first marriage coincide. However, the difference in the transition rate to first marriage between migrants and the native population is larger than that of first partnership. This suggests that the difference in partnership formation may interact with the type of union, reinforcing the contrast between the migrant and native populations.

The transition to first marriage does not reveal any systematic and significant difference between migrants and their descendants relative to native population. The similarity of estimates across migrant generations, observed both among women and men, suggests that the retreat from marriage is not more advanced among the descendants of immigrants born in the host country.

#### 6.2. Pathways to first partnership formation

A characteristic feature of modern family initiation is the disconnection of partnership formation from marriage. Competing risks models that distinguish between the entry into first partnership by direct marriage and cohabitation reveal the spread of this behaviour. In competing risks models, the respondents were followed starting from age 15 until the event of interest occurs, or until censoring at the competing event, interview or the 45<sup>th</sup> birthday of the respondent.

The results presented in Table 3 indicate that migrants differ markedly from the native population with regard to the pathways to union formation. Migrants exhibit a more conservative pattern than native Estonians with about twice as high a propensity to marry directly. Conversely, migrants are less prone to start living together with a partner without being married. The pattern shows only limited variation across gender; similarly, the hazard ratio for migrants features only marginal change following the inclusion of demographic and socio-economic controls in the model. The scale of migrant-native difference observed in competing risks models is considerably larger than that revealed by single-decrement models, discussed in the previous sub-section. It implies that the migrant origin matters more to the type of partnership than to the decision to start a union.

(Table 3 about here)

In all competing risk models presented in Table 3, the main contrast emerges between migrants and the native population. The estimates for migrant generations do not exhibit a systematic pattern. In most models, adjusted for demographic and socio-economic controls, and the residence in the host country (M4a-M4c), the difference between first-generation and second-generation migrants fails to reach the level of statistical significance. In the few models that reveal a significant difference between generations, the second generation does not exhibit patterns that were more similar to the native Estonian than those observed in the first generation.

#### 6.3. Cohabitation outcomes in first partnership

The spread of non-marital cohabitation often begins with the shift in the pathways of union formation as pre-marital cohabitation gradually replaces direct marriage. When living in partnership without being married becomes increasingly common and accepted, cohabiting unions drift away from being a short pre-marital arrangement to becoming more a lasting substitute for marriage that involves non-marital childbearing. To investigate this shift, we followed cohabiting partnerships from their formation until the conversion to marriage or dissolution; the observations were censored at the interview, partner's death or after 10 years since the beginning of cohabitation. We estimated single-decrement and competing risk models; the latter models make a distinction between the two alternative exits from cohabiting unions.

The results based on single-decrement models reveal a systematic difference in the duration of cohabitation between migrants and the native population (Table 4). A significantly elevated exit rate from cohabiting unions among migrant women and men implies a shorter duration and a more transitory nature of this partnership arrangement relative to their native counterparts. The comparison of estimates based on different models shows that the observed pattern is fairly independent of other demographic and socio-economic characteristics, and the control for arrival in the host country.

#### (Table 4 about here)

However, the contrast in the duration of cohabitation observed between migrants and the native population does not extend to migrant generations. None of the models revealed a

statistically significant difference in the exit from cohabiting unions between the first- and second-generation migrants. The similarity between migrants and their descendants is observed for both women and men.

The results based on competing risk models corroborate the above-described pattern. According to these models (available from the authors), migrant women and men demonstrate a significantly higher transition rate from cohabitation to marriage than native Estonians. Among migrant women, the same pattern extends to dissolution of cohabiting unions while migrant men fail to exhibit a statistically significant difference from their native counterparts. In line with the results reported earlier in this section, competing risk models show no significant difference in cohabitation outcomes between migrant generations.

#### 6.4. Dissolution of first partnership

Table 5 presents the estimates for the break-up of first partnership. To obtain these results, respondents were followed from the start-date until the break-up of first of union; the observations were censored at the interview, partner's death or after 25 years had elapsed since the formation of partnership.

Unlike for partnership formation, the estimates for union dissolution do not reveal a systematic difference between migrants and the native population. As regards women, the difference in dissolution risks between migrants and native Estonians is negligible in all models. Among men, there are some signs of a lower likelihood of partnership dissolution among migrants, although the contrast is relatively small and reaches the level of statistical significance in only a few models.

#### (Table 5 about here)

The comparison between migrants and their descendants indicates a somewhat higher rate of union dissolution among the second generation. The difference between the first- and second-generation migrants is systematic and statistically significant among both women and men. Particularly for men, the final models exhibit a somewhat greater similarity between estimates for the second generation and the native population than between the two migrant generations.

The estimates for the break-up of first marriage, presented in Table 5, demonstrate a closely similar pattern.

#### 6.5. Formation of second partnership

With the rise in separations and divorces that tend to occur at an increasingly younger age, a growing number of people have a chance to enter more than one partnership during their lifetime. In this study, we investigated the formation of second partnership among the respondents who had experienced the break-up or partner's death in their first union. We followed this group of respondents from the end of their first partnership; observations were censored at the interview or after 15 years had elapsed since the end of first union.

The results presented in Table 6 show that migrants to Estonia feature somewhat lower chances of re-partnering than the native population. This finding is opposite to that reported for first partnerships in the previous sections. The lower propensity of migrants to enter second partnership does not vary across gender, but possibly due to the smaller size of our male sample, the model fails to reveal a statistically significant difference for men. The stability of the pattern across different models suggests that lower chances of re-partnering are independent of demographic and socio-economic characteristics, and the control for residence in the host country.

#### (Table 6 about here)

The evidence pertaining to migrant generations shows that the descendants of migrants are not more prone to start second union than the first generation. Our results suggest that among migrant men the transition rate to second union is significantly lower than in the first generation. However, this does not imply that the second generation would exhibit a pattern more similar to that observed in the native population. Quite the contrary, for both women and men, the models reveal a statistically significant difference between the second generation and native Estonians, which appears not to be the case for the first generation.

#### 6.6. Pathways to second partnership formation

The evidence concerning the pathways to second partnership formation corroborates the results reported above on the first partnership formation. As shown in Table 7, migrants are more likely than the native population to marry directly in their second unions. Conversely, migrants are less prone to start living together with a partner without being married. The differences between migrants and the native Estonians are statistically significant among both women and men. Like in the case of first partnerships, the observed pattern is robust and exhibits limited variation across models.

The difference between migrant generations appears more limited and does not follow a uniform pattern. In most models, the difference in the propensity to enter the second partnership by direct marriage or cohabitation is not significant between the first and second generation statistically. Even if the failure to reach the level of significance results from a limited number of transitions to second partnership in our data, in most cases the descendants of migrants do not exhibit hazard ratios that were more similar to those observed among the native population.

(Table 7 about here)

#### 6.7. Cohabitation outcomes in second partnership

Just as the choice between direct marriage and cohabitation, the difference in exit from cohabiting unions extends to higher-order partnerships. As reported for first partnerships in previous sections, migrants demonstrate a significantly higher exit rate from cohabiting unions (Table 8). This finding holds true for both migrant women and men. The limited variation across models indicates that the observed pattern is relatively independent of other characteristics considered in the analysis.

The evidence concerning first- and second-generation migrants does not reveal a uniform pattern. Among women, the models adjusted for demographic and socio-economic characteristics reveal a significant difference between migrant generations. Women in the second generation exhibit a somewhat slower exit from cohabitation than the first generation. The estimates based on single-decrement models place second-generation women in a middle position between their native and first-generation counterparts. However, the estimates

pertaining to migrant men reveal no significant difference between the first and second generation.

#### (Table 8 about here)

The results drawn from competing risk models (available from the authors) for the second partnership, to a large extent, corroborate the findings reported above. As in the case of first partnerships, both male and female migrants are more prone to convert their cohabitation to marriage than the native population. Also, the main contrast in the propensity to marry among cohabitants runs between migrants and the native Estonians; the difference between first- and second-generation migrants is smaller and statistically insignificant. The estimates for separation from second cohabiting union provide a less consistent account.

#### 6.8. Interactions with birth cohort

The results presented in the previous sections were obtained from the main effects models. To add to these findings and gain an insight into the dynamics of the inter-group differences, we employ interactions between migrant status and birth cohort. In particular, we focus on pathways to partnership formation that exhibited systematic and large contrasts between migrants and the native population in the main effects models. We estimated competing risk models, but unlike in the previous sections, we modelled the entry into marriage and non-marital cohabitation jointly (Hoem *et al.* 2008). This analytical approach allows for direct comparison between the alternative pathways to partnership formation, controlling for factors that may influence the process.

Figure 1 presents an account of trends in first partnership formation for women and men born in 1924–1939, 1940–1954, 1955–1969 and 1970–1983, standardised for the effects of control variables. For each birth cohort, the propensity to enter first union by cohabitation is shown relative to the corresponding propensity of direct marriage. This presentation indicates a progressive shift in the pathways to first partnership formation, independent of changes in the intensity of union formation over time and variation across sub-groups of the population.

(Figure 1 about here)

The findings are in accord with the notion of universality of transformations in family patterns that belong to the core of the Second Demographic Transition. The results show that lower propensity to start cohabitation and higher propensity to enter direct marriage among migrants, observed in the main effects models, reflects a somewhat later transformation in partnership patterns among the latter group. In the cohorts born before 1940, the standardised rate of direct marriage exceeded that of cohabitation among migrants as well as among the native population. In the following generations, the pattern transformed more rapidly among the latter. Native Estonians completed the turn away from the traditional model of family initiation in generations born in the late 1950s and 1960s. Among migrants, the shift from marriage to cohabitation occurred in the cohorts born in the 1970s. A time-lag relative to native Estonians can be observed among both migrant women and men.

Figure 1 does not distinguish between migrants and their descendants but the proportion of migrants belonging to the first and second generation changes markedly from one birth cohort to the next. This allows us to draw some additional conclusions on migrant generations. In accord with the results based on the main effects models, the evidence drawn from interactions supported the view that family formation behaviour of the second-generation migrants has not converged with that of the native population. Judging from young adults of migrant origin who overwhelmingly belong to the second generation, the descendants of migrants have continued to exhibit a somewhat more traditional pattern of family building.

The interaction between birth cohort and the mode of second partnership formation yields largely similar results (Figure 2). Although in second unions, the risk of entry into cohabitation exceeded the propensity to enter direct marriage in all cohorts included in the analysis, migrants tend to exhibit a later and more gradual shift to non-marital cohabitation. The contrast in the pathways to second partnership between migrants and the native population peaks among younger birth cohorts included in the analysis. With regard to migrant generations, this corroborates the notion that the difference in partnership patterns does not fade away in the second generation.

(Figure 2 about here)

#### 7. Summary and discussion of the findings

In this study, we investigated family dynamics among migrants and their descendants in Estonia, against the background of the native population. Migration to Estonia started in the late 1940s and persisted at high levels until the late 1980s; the majority of migrants originated from the European part of Russia and other Slavic republics of the former Soviet Union. With regard to the period during which the large-scale migration occurred and the difference in the timeframe of demographic modernisation between receiving and sending countries, migration to Estonia bears a certain resemblance to post-war population movements from Southern Europe to the countries in Northern and Western Europe. However, compared to the latter, migration to Estonia occurred in a different economic, social and political context. The combination of these similarities and peculiarities renders Estonia a potentially interesting setting for the study of family dynamics among migrants and demographic integration.

The results lend support to our main expectations concerning the family dynamics among migrant population. In accord with the first hypothesis, we found that new family formation patterns, associated with the Second Demographic Transition, are less prevalent among migrants. The results also confirm our second hypothesis according to which the difference between migrants and the native population varies across family transitions. The results indicate that the difference between migrants and native Estonians is most pronounced in the mode of partnership formation and outcomes of cohabiting unions. Compared to the native population, migrants are less prone to start living together without being married; similarly, migrants are less likely to stay in cohabitation for longer periods. Smaller, though statistically significant, differences were observed in the transition to first and second partnerships. However, the results on union dissolution did not reveal a systematic difference between migrants and native Estonians.

Following our third hypothesis, we did not anticipate the convergence in family patterns between migrants and the native population in the second generation. The results generally support this assertion. For the majority of family transitions investigated in the study, the contrast emerges between the migrant and native population; conversely, the patterns for first-and second-generation migrants tend to be relatively similar. Only in a few cases – entry into first partnership (women), exit from second partnership (women) – the second generation exhibits a significantly greater similarity to that of the native population. In some cases, the

estimates for the two migrant generations differed significantly but the second generation featured even greater dissimilarity to the native population than the first generation.

In most transitions addressed in the study, the inter-group differences follow a similar pattern among women and men. The similarity also prevails in the transitions related to first and second partnerships. However, an interesting exception is the higher propensity of native Estonians to enter second partnerships (in first partnerships, the elevated entry rate was characteristic of migrants). The result corroborates findings from comparative studies according to which Estonia features a high prevalence of second-order partnerships. Based on the Family and Fertility Surveys, Prskawetz *et al.* (2003) reported that among 19 European countries, Estonia ranked second in the percentage of women who had experienced a second union by age 35. Although migrants in Estonia feature equally high rates of union dissolution, they seem to lag behind in the propensity to enter higher-order partnerships.

How do our results fit with theoretical perspectives outlined in the introductory sections of the study? Overall, we found ample evidence in support for the socialisation hypothesis. This is revealed by varying results across family transitions. On the one hand, we observed significant contrast between migrants and the native population in the mode of partnership formation; likewise, we reported a systematic difference in cohabitation outcomes. On the other hand, the results for partnership dissolution were relatively similar, particularly among women. The observed variation in results bears close resemblance to similarities and dissimilarities in family patterns that exist between Estonia and the countries of origin (Katus *et al.* 2002; Scherbov & Van Vianen 2004; Gerber & Berman 2011; Puur *et al.* 2012). Although the limited difference between the first and second generation may contradict the socialisation perspective, the relatively slow integration of migrants to host society allows this feature to be explained.

Additional support for the socialisation hypothesis comes from the effect of control variables. For none of the family transitions addressed in the study, the inclusion of socio-economic characteristics (education, labour market status) in the models resulted in a significant alteration in the effect of the main independent variable (migrant status/generation). Given the less secure economic position of migrants, the stability of estimates may be unexpected, particularly in view of the reasoning that relates the retreat of marriage and the increase in non-marital cohabitation to the economic difficulties and uncertainty (Perelli-Harris *et al.* 

2010; Perelli-Harris & Gerber 2011). In contrast, it seems that our findings lend greater support to a cultural explanation according to which the adoption of cohabitation and related family practices is driven by values and norms. The results suggest that family behaviour of migrant population in Estonia, including the second generation, has been to an important extent shaped by values and norms that prevail in the countries of origin.

Finally, an important implication of our findings relates to the role of contextual factors. We are inclined to think that the close similarity in the family transitions between the first and second generation reflects the influence of several factors that have slowed down the integration of the migrant population in Estonia. As identified by earlier research, these factors include historical legacies, high spatial concentration of migrants and the linguistic division of school system (Katus *et al.* 2002; Rannut 2008; Lindemann 2013). From another angle, results from interactions models draw attention to the advantage of a dynamic approach to migrants' family patterns. This allows a more nuanced account of the inter-group differences to be obtained and it can be ascertained whether the observed patterns reflect a time-lag in the spread of new family behaviours or other features. Finally, since integration of migrants is likely to stretch beyond the second generation in several countries, it is important to extend the analyses to the emerging third generation and pay careful attention to factors that facilitate or hinder integration.

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# Appendix

Table 1. Number of respondents and family transitions, Estonian FFS and GGS

	Women			Men			
	Respond.	Events	Events	Respond.	Events	Events	
First union							
Entry into union		Marriage	Cohabit.		Marriage	Cohabit.	
1 <sup>st</sup> generation	2 314	1 561	674	1 016	696	289	
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	870	376	377	601	236	246	
Native	6 847	2 661	3 562	3 710	1 283	1 976	
Cohabitation outcomes		Marriage	Separat.		Marriage	Separat.	
1 <sup>st</sup> generation	674	554	80	289	245	24	
1 <sup>st</sup> generation 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	377	277	50	246	153	30	
Native	3 562	2 438	530	1 976	1 319	256	
Dissolution		Dissol.			Dissol.		
1 <sup>st</sup> generation	2 229	704		985	227		
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	748	264		482	155		
Native	6 215	2 008		3 259	970		
Second union							
Entry into union		Marriage	Cohabit.		Marriage	Cohabit.	
1 <sup>st</sup> generation	1 145	135	396	285	57	133	
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	301	30	138	157	17	76	
Native	2 877	225	1 281	1 096	108	611	
Cohabitation outcomes		Marriage	Separat.		Marriage	Separat.	
1 <sup>st</sup> generation	396	255	53	133	82	14	
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	138	75	13	76	41	12	
Native	1 281	512	251	611	247	108	
Dissolution		Dissol.			Dissol.		
1 <sup>st</sup> generation	531	160		190	40		
1 <sup>st</sup> generation 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation	167	40		93	29		
Native	1 505	436		719	189		

Table 2. Transition to first partnership and first marriage, Estonian FFS and GGS

Population group	M1	M2	M3	M4a	M4b	M4c
	First part	narahin ı	vomon			
Migrant	1.19***	nership — v 1.26***	vomen 1.22***	1.29***	1.29***	_
Native (ref)	1.19	1.20	1.22	1.29	1.29	_
	•	·	·	•	•	
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant	1.07	1.10**	1.10**	1.20***	1.22***	1.15***
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Native	0.88***	0.85***	0.88***	0.87***	0.88***	0.87***
	First mar	riage — wo	men			
Migrant	1.46***	1.61***	1.59***	1.68***	1.68***	_
Native (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	_
1 <sup>st</sup> gonoration migrant	0.89**	0.89**	0.89**	0.94	0.93	1.00
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	1	1	0.09	1	0.93 1	1.00
Native	0.63***	0.57***	0.58***	0.57***	0.57***	0.57***
		nership — r				
Migrant	1.17***	1.22***	1.19***	1.26***	1.25***	_
Native (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	_
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant	1.17***	1.16**	1.18***	1.27**	1.24***	1.12
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Native	0.95	0.90**	0.94	0.93	0.91*	0.92
	First mar	riogo mo	n			
Migrant	1.47***	riage — me 1.63***	1.57***	1.66***	1.64***	_
Native (ref)	1.77	1.03	1.57	1.00	1.04	_
	-	÷	•	-	-	
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	1.04	1.00	1.00	1.06	1.04	1.04
2 <sup>™</sup> generation migrant (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Native	0.70***	0.62***	0.64***	0.63***	0.63***	0.63***

Model 1: controlled for process time and birth cohort.

Model 2: additionally controlled for process-specific variation (parity-pregnancy status, age at union formation/dissolution, partnership status etc).

Model 3: additionally controlled for educational attainment and employment status.

Model 4a: additionally controlled for time before arrival.

Model 4b: same as Model 3, time before arrival omitted.

Model 4c: same as Model 3, time before arrival omitted, only birth cohorts 1940-1979 included.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>p<0.01; \*\* p<0.05; \* p<0.1

Table 3. Pathways to first partnership formation, Estonian FFS and GGS

Population group	M1	M2	M3	M4a	M4b	M4c
	Direct me		-4	:	_	
Migrant	Direct ma 1.77***	1.98***	st partnersh 1.93***	ip — wome 2.03***	n 2.07***	_
Native (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	_
4 St	0 0 4 * * *	0 07***	0.00**	0.00	0.00*	0.00
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	0.84*** 1	0.87***	0.88** 1	0.92 1	0.88* 1	0.99 1
Native Native	0.49***	0.45**	0.46***	0.46***	0.44***	0.43***
	Cohabitat	ion in first p	artnership -	— women		
Migrant	0.75***	0.76***	0.73***	0.81***	0.82***	_
Native (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	_
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant	1.00	1.01	1.02	1.23***	1.28***	1.14
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Native	1.34***	1.32***	1.39***	1.37***	1.39***	1.39***
	Direct ma	rriage in fire	st partnersh	ip — men		
Migrant	1.94***	2.10***	2.02***	2.15***	2.12***	_
Native (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	_
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant	0.94	0.89	0.90	0.94	0.87	0.85
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Native	0.49***	0.44***	0.45***	0.45***	0.43***	0.43***
	Cohabitat	ion in first p	artnership -	— men		
Migrant	0.69***	0.70***	0.69***	0.73***	0.76***	_
Native (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	_
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant	1.01	1.01	1.04	1.15	1.18*	1.11
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Native	1.45***	1.43***	1.48***	1.46***	1.43***	1.43***

Model specification: see Table 2. \*\*\*p<0.01; \*\* p<0.05; \* p<0.1

Table 4. Exit from cohabitation in first partnership, Estonian FFS and GGS

Population group	M1	M2	M3	M4a	M4b	M4c	
	Exit from cohabitation in first partnership — women						
Migrant	1.39***	1.33***	1.34***	1.36***	1.38***	_	
Native (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	_	
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant	0.92	0.91	0.92	0.93	0.94	1.03	
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Native	0.69***	0.71**	0.71***	0.70***	0.70***	0.69***	
	Exit from	cohabitatio	n in first par	rtnership —	men		
Migrant	1.27***	1.29***	1.26**	1.29***	1.30***	_	
Native (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	_	
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant	1.09	1.02	0.96	1.00	1.04	1.12	
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Native	0.83**	0.78***	0.78***	0.78***	0.79***	0.76***	

Model specification: see Table 2. \*\*\*p<0.01; \*\* p<0.05; \* p<0.1

Table 5. Dissolution of first partnership and first marriage, Estonian FFS and GGS

Population group	M1	M2	M3	M4a	M4b	M4c
	<b>:</b>					
Migrant	1.00	nership — v 1.03	nomen 1.03	0.97	0.99	_
Native (ref)	1.00	1.03	1.03	1	1	_
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant	0.88*	0.90	0.91	0.85**	0.85**	0.86*
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Native	0.91	0.90	0.91	0.92	0.91	0.89*
	First mari	riage — wo	men			
Migrant	1.04	0.99	0.99	0.94	0.95	_
Native (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	_
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant	0.85**	0.89	0.89	0.84**	0.84**	0.83**
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Native	0.85**	0.92	0.93	0.94	0.93	0.93
	First part	nership — r	men			
Migrant	0.83***	0.90	0.91	0.88*	0.87**	_
Native (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	_
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	0.61***	0.62***	0.63***	0.60***	0.59***	0.59***
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Native	0.89	0.82**	0.82**	0.83**	0.84*	0.83**
	First mari	riage — me	n			
Migrant	0.85**	0.83***	0.85**	0.82***	0.82***	_
Native (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	_
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant	0.56***	0.57***	0.58***	0.56***	0.56***	0.57***
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Native Native	0.80**	0.82*	0.82**	0.83*	0.83*	0.82*

Model specification: see Table 2. \*\*\*p<0.01; \*\* p<0.05; \* p<0.1

Table 6. Transition to second partnership, Estonian FFS and GGS

Population group	M1	M2	M3	M4a	M4b	M4c
	Second p	oartnership -	— women			
Migrant	0.89**	0.90**	0.90**	0.89**	0.88**	_
Native (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	_
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant	1.12	1.14	1.14	1.14	1.14	1.11
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Native	1.22**	1.23**	1.23**	1.23**	1.25***	1.23**
	Second p	oartnership -	— men			
Migrant	0.94	0.93	0.91	0.92	0.92	_
Native (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	_
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant	1.40**	1.50***	1.46***	1.49***	1.45***	1.39**
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref) Native	1	1	1	1	1	1

1.31**	1.39***	1.40***	1.39***	1.37***	1.36**

Model specification: see Table 2. \*\*\*p<0.01; \*\* p<0.05; \* p<0.1

Table 7. Pathways to second partnership formation, Estonian FFS and GGS

Population group	M1	M2	M3	M4a	M4b	M4c
	Direct me	rriaga in aa	aand narta	robin wo	man	
Migrant	1.35***	1.27**	1.26**	ership — wo 1.24*	1.23*	
Native (ref)	1.33	1.27	1.20	1.24	1.23	_ _
	•	·	·	·	·	
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	0.93	0.96	0.95	0.94	0.90	0.94
	1	1	1	1	1	1
Native	0.70*	0.76	0.77	0.77	0.74	0.73
	Cohabitat	ion in seco	nd partners	hip — wome	en	
Migrant	0.81***	0.84***	0.84***	0.84***	0.83***	_
Native (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	_
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant	1.13	1.15	1.15	1.15	1.16	1.12
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Native	1.34***	1.31***	1.32***	1.32***	1.34***	1.33***
	Direct ma	rriage in se	cond partne	ership — me	en	
Migrant	1.77***	1.59***	1.62***	1.64***	1.62***	_
Native (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	-
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant	1.11	1.19	1.22	1.24	1.13	1.15
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Native	0.61*	0.72	0.72	0.72	0.68	0.66
	Cohabitat	ion in seco	nd partners	hin — men		
Migrant	0.81***	0.82**	0.80***	0.82**	0.81**	_
Native (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	_
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant	1.35**	1.41**	1.37**	1.40**	1.39**	1.34*
2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	1	1	1.07	1.40	1.00	1.04
Native	1.48***	1.50***	1.51***	1.49***	1.49***	1.49***


Model specification: see Table 2. \*\*\*p<0.01; \*\* p<0.05; \* p<0.1

Table 8. Exit from cohabitation in second partnership, Estonian FFS and GGS

Population group	M1	M2	M3	M4a	M4b	M4c
	Exit from	cohahitatio	nn in secono	d partnershi	n — women	ı
Migrant	1.54***	1.53***	1.54***	1.52***	1.50***	_
Native (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	_
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	1.26*	1.29**	1.33**	1.31**	1.34**	1.35**
Native	0.77***	0.79**	0.80*	0.80*	0.82	0.80*
	Exit from	cohabitation	on in second	d partnershi	p — women	l
Migrant	1.56***	1.59***	1.51***	1.51***	1.49***	_
Native (ref)	1	1	1	1	1	-
1 <sup>st</sup> generation migrant 2 <sup>nd</sup> generation migrant (ref)	0.87	0.91	0.89	0.88	0.93	1.00

Native	1	1	1	1	1	1
	0.59***	0.59***	0.61***	0.61***	0.64***	0.66***

Model specification: see Table 2. \*\*\*p<0.01; \*\* p<0.05; \* p<0.1







Figure 1. Birth cohort trends in relative difference between risks of starting first partnership as cohabitation or as direct marriage in Estonia by native and migrant women and men, birth cohorts 1924-1983.






Figure 2. Birth cohort trends in relative difference between risks of starting second partnership as cohabitation or as direct marriage in Estonia by native and migrant women and men, birth cohorts 1924-1983.

# Union Formation and Dissolution Among Immigrants and Their Descendants in the French Context

# Ariane Pailhé

#### Abstract:

This study uses retrospective information from the Trajectories and Origins survey (2008) to examine the timing of union formation, the type of the first union, and the timing of first separation for immigrants and their descendants living in metropolitan France. Male and female immigrants and their descendants form their first union later than the native French, but they have a higher risk of marrying directly. These risks are very high for immigrants from Turkey and the Maghreb, and they remain high for the second generation, especially the descendants of immigrants from Turkey and, to a lower extent, for those from the Maghreb. The propensity for cohabiting outside marriage is lower for immigrants and their descendants. Differences in education level and social background explain part of these specific behaviours, but the differences remain even after controlling for these characteristics.

Keywords: Immigrants, second generation, union formation, non-marital cohabitation, separation, France

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# 1. Introduction

As in many other European countries, patterns of partnership formation have dramatically changed in France over the past several decades. Formal marriage has lost ground to cohabitation, the age at which first-time couples are formed has risen, and separations have been more frequent (Sobotka & Toulemon 2008). Cohabitation models have gradually become more diverse as a result of changes in norms and other structural factors, such as additional years spent in education.

France has a long history of immigration, and immigrants represent a significant share of the whole population. They come from an extremely wide range of geographical zones. In some of these regions, unions may be formed in a very similar way to the prevailing French model, while in others marriage may be almost universal and the age at first marriage may still be very young. This article analyses the life course partnership dynamics of immigrants and their descendants in France.

Analysing the partnership dynamics of immigrants is complex, since they are influenced by both the standards and practices in their country of origin as well as those of their adopted country. Migration transforms the normative, social and economic context in which the decision is taken to form a union (Kulu & Milewski 2007). Moreover, migration is an important life course event and it influences timetables for couple formation (Tribalat 1996). However, research on immigrants' partnership behaviours has been mainly devoted to analysing intermarriage, which is considered a sign that newcomers have integrated (Gordon 1964; Kalminj 1998). Information on the timing of union formation among immigrants is more limited. Yet, the age at first union and the type of union may be affected by migration.

Even less research has been devoted to the partnership dynamics of immigrants' descendants. Their behaviours are less known, and questions do not arise in the same terms, since they were born and socialised in Europe (Hamel *et al.* 2012). Nevertheless, many questions still exist regarding how behaviour is affected by the intergenerational transmission of family values and practices, the family, and societal socialisation. The socialisation process of immigrants' descendants is characterised by potentially conflicting injunctions (De Valk & Liefbroer 2007; Hamel *et al.* 2012): they often grew up in families in which the institution of

marriage is of great importance, but unlike their parents, they have always lived in an environment where the dominant norm is the unmarried couple.

France has adopted a specific model of integration, i.e., assimilation which promotes the cultural conformity of immigrants and their descendants to the ideals of the French Republic. Most demographic studies have analysed to what extent this model affects: partner choice (Safi 2008; Hamel & Milewski 2010; Collet & Santelli 2012; Hamel *et al.* 2013), the age of fertility (Toulemon & Mazuy 2005; Hamel & Pailhé 2013), or entry into adulthood (Hamel *et al.* 2011). Very little research has examined partnership dynamics, except that of Tavan (2005). This paper investigates union formation and dissolution among immigrants and their descendants. Do immigrants and their descendant follow the marital behaviour of their country of origin or do they adopt behaviours that prevail in France? In other words, to what extent have immigrants and their descendants assimilated their host-country's norms? Since the migration patterns are very different between men and women, to what extent do partnership dynamics differ by gender? Are there specificities in some migration flows?

To answer these questions we analyse the timing of union formation, the type of the first union, and the timing of first separation for immigrants and their descendants living in France. The Trajectories and Origins survey provides an opportunity to investigate immigrants and their descendants' partnership dynamics. Differences by origins regarding the timing and the type of the union (i.e. direct marriage, marriage preceded by cohabitation, or cohabitation without marriage) reveal the level of importance ascribed both to the institution of marriage and to sexuality standards.

#### 2. The French context

# 2.1 Marital trajectories

The dynamics of how families are constituted have changed dramatically during the past 50 years. As in many other European countries, marriage has become less popular, the conjugal bond has weakened, and marital trajectories have become more complex. While marriage was close to universal in France in the 1960s, it is no longer a norm that applies to everyone. Hence, about 85% of men and women born in the mid-1950s were ever-married at age 49; the proportion is estimated to have fallen to 63% for men and 65% for women in the cohorts born

in the mid-1970s (figure 1). Age at first marriage was also postponed: first marriages in these cohorts were contracted, respectively, at age 25.0 and 30.6 for men, and 22.9 and 28.9 for women.

# (Figure 1 about here)

Direct marriages have become increasingly rare. Since the mid-1980s, only one first union out of 10 has begun with a formal marriage, while more than five out of 10 began in 1970 (Toulemon *et al.* 2008). First unions have also taken place later than before. The median age at first union formation increased from 23.8 for men born in 1955 to 26.0 for men born in 1971. This figure increased from 21.5 to 23.7 for women born in 1955 and 1974 (Prioux 2005). At the same time, the age at first partnership became more diverse between individuals.

Marriage is no longer a precondition to childbearing. Since there is no legal difference between the rights of children born inside or outside marriage, the number of births outside marriage began to increase at the end of the 1970s and they now outnumber births within marriage: while non-marital births were around 6% of births in the 1960s, they accounted for 57% of total births in 2012 (Mazuy *et al.* 2013).

Unions are also more fragile. Divorce rates have been increasing since the 1960s, reaching 46.2% in 2011. Dissolution risks are also higher for cohabiting unions. Finally, the growing diversity of pathways to adulthood (Robette 2010) is linked to the weakening of normative constraints that organise the life course; it is also linked to the growing uncertainty that characterises modern societies.

# 2.2. France: an old country of immigration

France has a long history of immigration. Indeed, mass immigration into France started as early as the middle of the nineteenth century in order to resolve labour shortages created by industrial growth (Schor 1996). At the beginning of the 1930s, 2.7 million immigrants (6.6% of the total population) were living in France, the second most predominant country in the world for immigration, after the USA. In the post-war years and during the economic upturn of the 1950s and 1960s, immigration was encouraged to assist France's economic

reconstruction. This mainly (single) male (unqualified) labour migration reached a peak in the period 1960-1974. In 1974 the French government officially stopped inward immigration – except family reunification - in response to the perceived increasing numbers of immigrants entering the country and to the growing economic crisis. In spite of incentives for returning to their own countries, many immigrants remained in France and were joined by their families. Thus, immigration continued to rise and it was henceforth female dominated. As family reunification was the most important channel of immigration, successive restrictive immigration policies were inefficient at stopping immigration flows. In 2010, the French population was made up of 10.7% immigrants (5.4 million). Since immigration started a long time ago, the descendants of immigrants also represent a significant share of the total population: about 10%.

The composition of immigration flows and the immigrant population according to country of origin changed over time. After the Second World War, the majority of immigrants came from Southern Europe (Italy, Spain and Portugal). Then France received an increasing number of immigrants from its former colonies in North and Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as South-East Asia. From the middle of the 1950s, the Maghrebis (i.e., those from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) and the Turkish have been the most significant groups of immigrants. Migration from South-East Asia (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) took place later and over a short period (mid-70s-mid 80s). Immigration from Sub-Saharan Africa (Senegal, Mali) is more recent and is gaining significance.

# 3. Data and method

#### 3.1 Data

The data we use come from the *Trajectories and Origins* (TeO) survey conducted in 2008 by the French National Institute of Demography (INED) and the French National Statistical Office (INSEE). The survey investigates the living conditions and social trajectories of immigrants and second generation immigrants living in France. Thus these groups were oversampled (Beauchemin *et al.* 2010). 22,000 persons living in France were interviewed. Native French and immigrants were 18-60 years old (cohorts 1948-1990) while descendants of immigrants were 18-50 years old (cohorts 1958-1990).

The survey contains retrospective biographical data concerning family and employment history, in particular dates (month and year) of first co-residence, first marriage and first separation; it also contains dates (month and year) of current relationship and current marriage. Since partnership histories are incomplete, e.g., the date of second partnership is missing for individuals with more than 2 unions (4.3% of the sample), we cannot analyse the timing of second partnership.

The survey also contains standard socioeconomic information and very detailed information on family background, e.g.: parents' social class, religion, level of education, number of siblings, language skills, etc. It also contains information on the co-resident partner, e.g.: year of birth, origin and nationality, religion, level of education, year of arrival in France, existence of family link. It also contains detailed information that defines groups of immigrants: individual's place of birth and nationality at birth, parent's place of birth and nationality at birth, year of arrival in France, reasons for arrival.

Native French are defined as individuals born to two French born parents. Immigrants are persons born abroad without French nationality at birth. Descendants of immigrants are persons born in metropolitan France with at least one immigrant parent. Individuals born in overseas French departments or whose parents were born in overseas French departments were also excluded from the analysis, since they are not immigrants and have specific partnership patterns. Cases with missing information or with inconsistent dates in their life history were also excluded from the analysis. Our sample counts 21,761 individuals.

The following aggregated regions of origin are used: the Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco), Sub-Saharan Africa (Senegal, Mali, Cameroon, Guinea, etc.), Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos), Turkey, Southern Europe (Italy, Spain and Portugal), other European countries and Western countries (including the USA, Cabana, Australia, etc.) and all other countries. Table 1 displays the sample size for each group and the share of each group in respect to the whole population.

(Table 1 about here)

#### 3.2 Analysis strategy

The partnership transitions analysed in this study include entry into first union and dissolution of first union. First union is defined as the first cohabiting union, the first marriage or the first civil partnership (PACS). Results are first presented in terms of univariate Kaplan-Meier estimates. Then Cox proportional hazards models (Cox 1972), stratified by sex, are estimated. We first estimate entry into first union. Then, first cohabitation and first direct marriage are estimated as competing risks. Since first direct PACS is an extremely rare event, we do not analyse it separately. PACS partners differ more from married partners than from cohabiting partners (Bailly & Rault 2013); thus we consider PACS as cohabitation in competing risks models. We finally estimate the transition to first separation. For the analysis of transition to first union, the risk set is fixed at age 15 and cases are censored at the interview date, at age 45 or, if applicable, in the event of a competing risk. For the analysis of transition to first union dissolution, the risk set is defined at the beginning of first union and individuals are censored at interview, death of first partner or after 30 years of union.

The same set of control covariates is used, with the covariates being added step by step. Model 1 controls for migration status (either aggregate or detailed) and cohort. Four birth cohorts are distinguished: born in 1948-1957, in 1958-1967, in 1968-1977 and in 1978-1990. Model 2 controls for pregnancy status, i.e., a time-varying variable computed as year of first birth minus 0.7 years. Additional variables are introduced for modelling the transition to separation: age at first union formation and two time-varying dummies indicating direct marriage and indirect marriage. Model 3 controls for economic resources. The timing of union formation is usually strongly correlated to the level of education. It is thus introduced with four dummy variables: no education, low education (primary), medium level (secondary) and high education (university). Couple formation is also related to employment status (Ekert & Solaz 2001; Mills et al. 2005). The activity status - whether the respondent is still in education or is employed in a stable job<sup>7</sup>- is computed for each calendar year. This timedependent variable is lagged by one year. Model 4 controls for migration history, since a time-varying variable for the time in France is included. Finally, some background variables are introduced in model 5, since individuals may adhere to behaviours, values, and norms that dominated during their childhood (Michaël & Tuma 1985). Social background is taken into account through parent's social class, and religiosity through dummies indicating the level of

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Unfortunately, the detailed employment history is available only for years spent in France.

its importance during childhood education. We use this last variable rather than religion, since religion is correlated to the country of origin.

4. Results: Union formation

4.1. Descriptive analysis

Immigrant men and their descendants tend to enter into their first union later than the native French. The median age at first union formation is, respectively, 26.2 and 25.8, which is one year and a half and two years later than native French men (table 2). At age 25, 55% of native French men have formed their first union, compared to only 42% of immigrants and 43% of their descendants (figure 2). This postponement of entry into partnership concerns all immigrants and their descendants, except those from Turkey or Southern Europe (table 3). Turkish immigrants form their first union even earlier than the native French. Conversely, immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa form couples much later.

The median age at first union is also higher for immigrant women and their descendants, as compared to native French women. However, some immigrant women form their first union quite early, especially women from Turkey: 25% have formed their first union before age 17.5, and one half before age 20. This is no more the case for the descendants of Turkish immigrants, whose age at first union is very close to native French women. Second generation women of all other origins enter into first union later than native French women. As is the case with men, the postponement of union formation is higher for those with Sub-Saharan origins.

(Table 2 about here)

(Table 3 about here)

(Figure 2 about here)

Country of origin influences union formation not just in terms of timing, but also in terms of the type of union. With regard to marriage, the picture is rather different compared to that of first union formation. In general, immigrant men and women marry much earlier than native

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French. Immigrant men marry two years earlier than native French men (table 4). Immigrant women also tend to marry at even younger ages than the native French women do: their median age stands at, respectively, ages 24.4 and 27.7. Some of them marry at young ages: one immigrant in four marries before age 20.5. On the other hand, descendants of immigrants, men more than women, tend to marry later than immigrants and native French do. At age 45, few immigrants have never been married at least once (figure 3). Survival estimates show that less than 15% of immigrants, male and female, have never been married. This share is higher for native French (30% for men and 25% for women) and even greater for descendants of immigrants (about 35% for men and 30% for women).

For women, all groups of immigrants marry earlier than native French women (table 5 and figure 3). For some groups, marriage occurs quite early: for instance, 25% of Turkish female immigrants were married before age 18 and 25% of immigrants from Southern Europe or North Africa were married before age 20. For men, some groups of immigrants tend to marry earlier than the native French do, while others marry later. Turkish immigrants and immigrants from Southern Europe marry much earlier; immigrants from North Africa and from EU also marry earlier. Immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia tend to marry later. All groups of descendants of immigrants tend to marry later than native French, except descendants of Turkish immigrants. The median age at marriage is, respectively, 1.5 and 2 years lower than that of native French males and females. But marriage occurs 3 years later for the Turkish second generation when compared to the first generation of Turkish immigrants.

(Table 4 about here)

(Table 5 about here)

(Figure 3 about here)

# 4.2. Multivariate analysis

Multivariate analysis confirms previous results. Table 6 presents the results of the event history models for the transition to first union (whatever its type), with all immigrants being regrouped together. Table 7 is categorized into separate origins. Even after controlling for

cohort, migration history, economic resources and family background, the risk of union formation is significantly lower for immigrants and their descendants than for native French, both for men and women. In particular, controlling for all sets of variables reduces the gap between male immigrants and native French men. The relative risk of first union becomes close to that of native once migration history is controlled for (model 4). In other words, the first union is postponed by the migration itself. Conversely, for immigrant women, the relative risk of first union is even lower compared with native French after controlling for all sets of variables, especially the level of education and activity status. Indeed, immigrant women have a lower level of education than native French women, and less educated women tend to accelerate partnership formation. For a given level of education, the gap between immigrant women and native French women is higher. The relative risk of first union is much less affected by the inclusion of demographic and socio-economic controls for the second generation, both for men and women. Indeed, their average levels of education and background are quite close to those of the native French population. Thus, the relative risk remains lower than that of native French.

There are significant differences between groups of various immigrants and their descendants. These differences by origin remain after controlling for several demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Immigrant Turkish men and women have a higher risk of union formation than native French. This is also the case for male immigrants from Southern Europe and from other European and Western countries. On the other hand, male and female immigrants from South East Asia, the Maghreb or Sub-Saharan Africa have a lower risk of union formation.

As seen previously, partnership behaviours of descendants of immigrants significantly differ from those of immigrants. For men, descendants of immigrants form their first union later than the first generation, except descendants of EU, Western, and South-East Asian countries. The latter still have a lower risk of union formation compared to native French men. The risk of first union for descendants of immigrants from Turkey and Southern Europe is not significantly different from that of native French men. Differences between first and second generation immigrants are lower for women. There is no difference between generations of female immigrants with Sub-Saharan and North-African origins. On the other hand, descendants of immigrants from South East Asia and Turkey are closer to native French

women. This is especially true for Turkish immigrants, whose relative risks of union formation are not significantly different from that of natives.

(Table 6 about here)

(Table 7 about here)

# 4.3. The type of first union

Distinguishing direct marriage and cohabitation shows that differences between origins are more pronounced in the mode of partnership formation. Immigrants (men and women) are more prone to marry directly while they are less likely to start living with a partner without being married (table 8). The female descendants of immigrants also tend to opt for direct marriage rather than cohabitation. This pattern does not hold for male descendants of immigrants.

Immigrants from Turkey and North Africa have a much higher risk of marrying directly than native French men and women (tables 9 and 10). These immigrants come from countries where unmarried cohabitation remains rare and where sexuality outside marriage is (or was<sup>8</sup>) - illegal. Compared to native French, the risk of direct marriage is very high, since this is very rare for native French men. Immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Europe also have a higher risk, but differences from natives are much lower. For men, differences between various groups of descendants of immigrants and natives are lower. There are still higher risks of direct marriage for descendants of Turkish and North African immigrants, but these risks are lower compared to immigrants. Conversely, for women, immigrants from North Africa and their descendants have the same risk of direct marriage. The risk of direct marriage is even greater for descendants of Turkish female immigrants than for Turkish immigrants.

Patterns for cohabitation without marriage are the opposite. Immigrants are less prone to cohabit than native French, except those from Southern Europe and Western countries. There is no convergence in such family patterns between second generation immigrants and the native population: descendants of immigrants are as reluctant to cohabit as their parents.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> In Turkey it was illegal until the 2000s.

Taking into account control variables diminishes the direct marriage gap between immigrants and their descendants versus French natives --especially regarding immigrant women, for whom the odds-ratios for direct marriage are cut in half from model 1 to model 5. For immigrant women, especially those coming from the Maghreb, Sub-Saharan Africa and Turkey, direct marriage appears to be clearly linked with a low level of education and, to a lower extent, with the timing of migration, lower social background, and greater importance of religion. For men, differences in social background between immigrants and native French explain part of the gap, especially for Turkish immigrants. But even after controlling for several covariates, the gap remains. The risk of direct marriage is also much lower for descendants of Turkish immigrants after controlling for education level and social background. But it remains much higher compared to native French men and women.

(Table 8 about here)

(Table 9 about here)

(Table 10 about here)

# 5. Results: Dissolution of first union

# 5.1. Descriptive analysis

Immigrants' first unions are less fragile than those of French natives (figure 4). Five years after first union formation (whatever its form), around 10% of immigrants have separated, against 16% of French natives. Fifteen years after, 22% of immigrants have separated against around 30% of natives. On the other hand, second generation immigrants are more prone to break their union: 21% of men and 17% of women have separated 5 years after union formation. These figures reach, respectively, 36% and 32% 15 years after union formation.

(Figure 4 about here)

#### 5.2. Multivariate analysis

Once controlled for demographic and socio-economic characteristics, the difference in the propensity of separation between immigrants and native French does not persist for men and is considerably reduced for women (table 11). Conversely, it is still significant for the descendants of immigrants. Moreover, there are significant differences between various immigrants and descendants of immigrant groups (table 12). Immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and immigrants from Western and EU countries (except Southern Europe) have higher risks of separation. On the other hand, risks of separation compared to native French are very low for Turkish immigrants. Descendants of Western and EU countries also have a higher risk of separation; it is also high for female descendants of North African and Sub-Saharan immigrants.

(Table 11 about here)

(Table 12 about here)

# 6. Conclusion

This study investigates union formation and dissolution among immigrants and their descendants in France using data from the Trajectories and Origin survey. The analysis shows significant differences in partnership trajectories across population subgroups. First of all, first and second generation immigrants form their first union later than the native French, men as well as women. There are small differences by gender regarding partnership behaviours. Similarly to French natives, women in all groups enter into partnerships earlier than men. But differences according to origins do not vary according to gender.

All groups have lower risks of union formation, except immigrants from Turkey and Southern Europe. However, patterns differ depending on the type of union. Male and female immigrants as well as their descendants have a higher risk of marrying directly. These risks are very high for immigrants from Turkey and the Maghreb, and they remain high for the second generation, especially for the descendants of immigrants from Turkey and, to a lower extent, from the Maghreb. On the other hand, the propensity to cohabit outside marriage is lower for immigrants, especially for those who come from countries where such behaviour is very rare. The descendants of immigrants from these countries reproduce their parents'

behaviours in that respect. The institution of marriage remains important to them, and they diverge from the dominant French norm of the unmarried couple. Partnership behaviours of immigrants are in-between the French standards and the standards in the country of origin. Turkey, Sub-Saharan and North African countries are countries where norms of early marriage for women prevail. Due to the strong norm of virginity at marriage, direct marriage is more frequent in Muslim countries such as the Maghreb and Turkey. Marriage is also important, but to a lower extent, in Catholic countries such as those in Southern Europe.

The higher propensity to marry rather than cohabit may explain why immigrants have lower risks of separation. However, this explanation does not hold for all groups. Immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and descendants of immigrants from the Maghreb have both a higher risk of union dissolution and a higher risk of marriage.


Finally, controlling for a large set of demographic and socio-economic variables reduces the differences among population subgroups. Differences in education level and social background explain a significant part of the behaviours, especially regarding the propensity for direct marriage. However significant differences remain even after controlling for these characteristics. Not all possible factors are controlled for. Hence, the professional path is imperfectly taken into account, although it significantly influences partnership trajectories. Nevertheless, it appears that each group of immigrants has its own behaviours regarding partnership formation; these behaviours lie in-between those of their country of origin and those of their adopted country. The descendants of immigrants are also very diverse: those from South-East Asia, Southern Europe and other EU and Western countries have behaviours similar to those of the native French, while descendants of North Africa and Turkey still adopt the behaviours of their parents.

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# Appendix



Source: Mazuy et al., 2013

Figure 1. Proportion of ever married men and women at different ages, by cohort (%)

Table 1. Sample size

		Total	% weighted	Women	% weighted	Men	% weighted	1948- 1960	1961- 1970	1971- 1980	1981- 1990
1G	Maghreb	2,083	3.4	1,079	3.3	1,004	3.5	683	611	543	246
1G	Sub-Saharan Africa	1,401	1.1	770	1.2	631	1.0	306	432	440	223
1G	South East Asia	774	0.3	376	0.3	398	0.4	315	231	192	36
1G	Turkey	830	0.6	384	0.6	446	0.7	139	201	342	148
1G	Southem Europe	1,330	1.8	677	1.8	653	1.9	710	433	140	47
1G	EU & Western countries	815	1.2	527	1.5	288	0.9	313	263	165	74
1G	Other countries	1,221	2.0	678	2.1	543	1.9	355	367	322	177
1G	Total	8,454	10.5	4,491	10.8	3,963	10.2	2,821	2,538	2,144	951
2G	Maghreb	2,432	3.3	1,362	3.4	1,070	3.2	65	431	824	1,112
2G	Sub-Saharan Africa	815	0.4	443	0.4	372	0.5	6	42	178	589
2G	South-East Asia	572	0.2	273	0.2	299	0.3	4	29	113	426
2G	Turkey	448	0.2	235	0.3	213	0.2	2	4	110	332
2G	Southem Europe	2,641	4.1	1,335	3.8	1,306	4.4	201	801	916	723
2G	EU & Western countries	704	1.6	356	1.4	348	1.8	104	222	200	178
2G	Other countries	546	0.8	266	0.8	280	8.0	21	76	134	315
2G	Total	8,158	10.7	4,270	10.3	3,888	11.1	403	1,605	2,475	3,675
Nati	ve	3,764	78.9	1,988	79.0	1,776	78.8	904	1062	930	868
Tota	al	21,761	100.0	10,281	100.0	5,484	100.0	5,484	5,484	5,484	5,484


Source: TeO, 2008

Table 2. Median age at first union formation by origin and sex

		Men			Women	
	First Generation	Second Generation	Native	First Generation	Second Generation	Native
Q3	30.3	30.3	28.4	27.3	27.8	25.5
Me	26.2	25.8	24.7	22.8	23.7	22.6
Q1	22.8	22.9	21.9	19.8	21	20.1
N	3,825	3,770	1,726	4,359	4,137	1,944

Table 3. Median age at first union formation by country of origin and sex

			First	Genera	ation					Secon	d Gene	eration		
	Maghreb	Africa	South East Asia	Turkey	Southern Europe	Other EU Western	Other	Maghreb	Africa	South East Asia	Turkey	Southern Europe	Other EU Western	Other
Men														
Q3	31.0	32.6	32.7	26.3	27.0	28.9	31.0	33.0	31.8	37.7	28.9	28.3	27.5	32.5
Me	27.3	28.7	28.0	23.5	23.8	25.2	26.7	27.3	28.0	27.4	25.2	24.9	24.0	27.1
Q1	24.1	24.8	24.3	21.1	21.7	22.0	23.4	23.9	23.8	24.4	22.1	22.4	22.0	23.5
N	969	602	386	436	639	267	526	1,043	367	293	206	1,257	334	270
Wom	nen													
Q3	27.9	29.8	28.3	23.4	24.6	26.1	28.0	29.0	33.0	28.0	26.0	26.5	26.7	28.5
Me	23.0	24.3	24.1	19.8	21.7	22.9	24.0	24.3	26.3	24.1	22.7	23.0	23.0	23.9
Q1	19.8	20.0	20.7	17.6	19.5	20.6	20.7	21.5	22.5	21.6	20.2	20.6	20.7	21.7
N	1,049	734	366	382	664	506	658	1,329	436	262	233	1,285	337	255







Figure 2. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of entering into first union, by sex and origin

Table 4. Median age at first marriage by origin and sex

		Men		Women				
	First Generation	Second Generation	Native	First Generation	Second Generation	Native		
Q3	34.4			31.1				
Me	28.2	33.8	30.6	24.4	29.0	27.7		
Q1	24.3	26.9	25.5	20.5	23.5	22.7		
N	3,818	3,766	1,724	4,351	4,135	1,942		

Table 5. Median age at first marriage by country of origin and sex

			Firs	t Gene	eration					Seco	nd Ge	neratio	1	
	Maghreb	Africa	South East Asia	Turkey	Southern Europe	Other EU Western	Other	Maghreb	Africa	South East Asia	Turkey	Southern Europe	Other EU Western	Other
Men														
Q3	33.0	39.3	38.9	26.7	32.0	41.7	34.6				37.3			
Me	28.4	31.7	30.5	23.8	25.3	28.5	29.3	33.7	38.5	41.7	26.6	33.7	30.2	35.8
Q1	25.2	27.7	25.9	21.3	22.7	24.2	25.6	26.9	30.7	28.0	23.5	26.8	25.0	29.4
N	947	602	385	436	637	266	525	1,043	367	293	206	1,254	333	270
Wome	n													
Q3	29.0	38.8	34.7	23.7	27.9	33.4	32.3				27.6			
Me	23.7	27.3	26.7	20.1	22.6	26.3	26.7	27.7	34.0	31.9	23.4	29.5	29.8	31.3
Q1	20.0	21.3	22.2	17.7	20.1	22.6	21.7	23.1	26.8	26.8	20.2	23.5	24.1	24.7
N	1,047	731	366	381	663	506	657	1,329	436	262	233	1283	337	255






Figure 3. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of entering into first marriage, by sex and origin

Table 6. Relative risk of first union (cohabiting or married), by origin and sex

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Men					
First Generation	0.86 ***	0.74 ***	0.74 ***	0.91 **	0.94 *
Second	0.83 ***	0.83 ***	0.83 ***	0.82 ***	0.83 ***
Generation					
Native	1	1	1	1	1
N (events)	9,321 (6,60	9)			
Women					
First Generation	0.91 ***	0.85 ***	0.71 ***	0.76 ***	0.77 ***
Second	0.79 ***	0.81 ***	0.77 ***	0.77 ***	0.78 ***
Generation					
Native	1	1	1	1	1
N (events)	10,440 (8,1	10)			

Model 1: controlled for migration status and cohort.

Model 2: additionally controlled for pregnancy status.

Model 3: additionally controlled for level of education and activity status.

Model 4: additionally controlled for migration history

Model 5: additionally controlled for social background and religiosity.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 7. Relative risk of first union (cohabiting or married), by country of origin and sex

Men	Model 1 Model 2		I 2	Mode	Model 3		I 4	Model 5		
1G Maghreb	0.77	***	0.64	***	0.67	***	0.77	***	0.79	***
1G Africa	0.65	***	0.55	***	0.58	***	0.65	***	0.67	***
1G South East Asia	0.66	***	0.60	***	0.63	***	0.66	***	0.66	***
1G Turkey	1.57		1.25		1.33		1.58	***	1.61	***
1G Southern Europe	1.29		1.15		1.15		1.22	***	1.24	***
1G Other EU &	0.98	***	0.93	***	0.99	***	1.30	***	1.29	***
Western countries										
1G Other countries	0.78	***	0.65	***	0.74	***	0.87	**	0.88	**
2G Maghreb	0.63	***	0.65	***	0.62	***	0.62	***	0.63	***
2G Africa	0.58	***	0.56	***	0.56	***	0.56	***	0.57	***
2G South East Asia	0.59	***	0.67	***	0.66	***	0.67	***	0.67	***
2G Turkey	1.01	***	0.95	***	0.92	***	0.94	***	0.96	
2G Southern Europe	0.98	***	0.96	***	0.95	***	0.96	***	0.96	
2G Other EU &	1.12		1.18		1.20		1.19		1.20	**
Western countries		ala ala ala		***		***		***		***
2G Other countries	0.70	***	0.72	***	0.74	***	0.74	***	0.74	***
Native	1		1		1		1		1	
N (events)	9,321	(6,609)								
Women										
1G Maghreb	0.90	***	0.79	***	0.64	***	0.67	***	0.67	***
1G Africa	0.74	***	0.71	***	0.52	***	0.51	***	0.52	***
1G South East Asia	0.75	***	0.71	***	0.63	***	0.63	***	0.62	***
1G Turkey	1.72		1.58	***	1.12		1.22	***	1.20	***
1G Southern Europe	1.14		1.08		0.93	***	0.89	**	0.89	**
1G Other EU &	0.96	***	0.88	**	0.96	***	0.99		1.01	
Western countries										
1G Other countries	0.79	***	0.76	***	0.69	***	0.72	***	0.72	***
2G Maghreb	0.70	***	0.70	***	0.64	***	0.65	***	0.64	***
2G Africa	0.51	***	0.58	***	0.49	***	0.50	***	0.50	***
2G South East Asia	0.73	***	0.85	*	0.81	***	0.82	**	0.83	**
2G Turkey	1.04	**	1.10		0.90	***	0.92	***	0.92	
2G Southern Europe	0.91	***	0.92	*	0.87	***	0.88	***	0.87	***
2G Other EU &	0.88	***	0.86	**	0.89	***	0.89	*	0.90	
Western countries	0.70	***	0.70	***	0.77	***	0.77	***	0.70	***
2G Other countries	0.72		0.76		0.77		0.77		0.78	***
Native	1	0/0.440	. 1		1		1		1	
N (events)	-	0(8,110	,							

Model 1: controlled for migration status and cohort.

Model 2: additionally controlled for pregnancy status.

Model 3: additionally controlled for level of education and activity status.

Model 4: additionally controlled for migration history

Model 5: additionally controlled for social background and religiosity. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 8. First cohabitation/marriage as competing risks, by origin and sex

	Model 1		Model	2	Model	3	Model	4	Model	5
Men										
Marriage (Ce	ensoring at coh	abitati	on)							
First	2.95	***	2.54	***	2.51	***	2.42	***	1.94	***
Generation										
Second	1.24	*	1.25	*	1.22	*	1.23	*	1.04	
Generation										
Native			1		1		1		1	
N(events)	9,321(1,029)									
	n (Censoring at									
First	0.72	***	0.66	***	0.66	***	0.78	***	0.84	***
Generation		***		***		***		***		***
Second	0.79	***	0.80	***	0.79	***	0.79	***	0.82	***
Generation	4		4		4		4		4	
Native	1		1		1		1		1	
N(events)	9,321(5,331)									
Women										
• ,	ensoring at coh		•							
First	3.43	***	3.22	***	2.16	***	1.78	***	1.50	***
Generation		***		***		***		***		***
Second	1.66	***	1.71	***	1.55	***	1.57	***	1.35	***
Generation Native	1		4		4		4		4	
	•		1		1		1		1	
N(events)	10,440(1,462)	<del>-</del> -								
	n (Censoring at	marria		***	0.00	***	0.00	***	0.70	***
First Generation	0.74		0.72	***	0.63		0.69		0.72	
Second	0.73	***	0.74	***	0.72	***	0.73	***	0.75	***
Generation	0.73		0.74		0.72		0.73		0.75	
Native	1		1		1		1		1	
N(events)	10,440(6,439)		'		'		'			
in(Creins)	10,440(0,439)									

Model 1: controlled for migration status and cohort. Model 2: additionally controlled for pregnancy status.

Model 3: additionally controlled for level of education and activity status.

Model 4: additionally controlled for migration history

Model 5: additionally controlled for social background and religiosity.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 9. First cohabitation/marriage as competing risks, men by country of origin

If Samplified		Model 1		Mode	1 2	Mode	l 3	Mode	l 4	Mode	l 5
1G Maghreb	Marriage (Censoring a	t cohabitatio	n)								
16 South East Asia   1.32   1.22   1.21   1.20   1.10	1G Maghreb	3.35	***	2.80	***	2.74	***	2.78	***	2.23	***
Tig Turkey	1G Africa	2.20	***	1.91	***	1.96	***	1.94	***	1.59	***
1G Southern Europe	1G South East Asia	1.32		1.22		1.21		1.20		1.10	
1.6 Other EU &   1.30   1.23   1.38   1.48   1.47	1G Turkey	10.47	***	8.64	***	8.15	***	8.31	***	6.78	***
Western countries	1G Southern Europe	2.19	***	1.97	***	1.77	***	1.75	***	1.46	**
1G Other countries	1G Other EU &	1.30		1.23		1.38		1.48		1.47	
2G Maghreb       1.75       ****       1.80       ****       1.73       ****       1.73       ****       1.44       ***         2G Africa       1.59       *       1.56       *       1.55       *       1.56       *       1.26       ***       1.26       ***       1.26       ***       1.26       ***       1.26       ***       1.26       ***       1.26       ***       1.26       ***       1.26       ***       1.26       ***       1.26       ***       1.26       ***       1.26       ***       1.26       ***       0.89       0.89       ***       0.88       0.89       0.89       ***       0.88       ***       5.51       ****       5.57       ****       4.38       ****       26       0.60       0.72       *       0.67       ***       0.67       ***       0.67       ***       0.67       ***       0.60       0.62       0.69       0.69       0.69       0.62       0.62       0.69       0.69       0.62       0.62       0.69       0.69       0.62       0.62       0.69       0.69       0.62       0.62       ***       0.60       ***       0.62       ***       0.60       ***       0.62 <th>Western countries</th> <th></th>	Western countries										
2G Africa	1G Other countries	2.15	***	1.81	***	2.04	***	2.08	***	1.84	***
2G South East Asia	2G Maghreb	1.75	***	1.80	***	1.73	***	1.73	***	1.44	**
2G Turkey 6.17 *** 5.98 *** 5.51 *** 5.57 *** 4.38 *** 2G Southern Europe 0.75 0.74 0.72 * 0.72 * 0.67 ** 2G Other EU & 1.07 1.11 1.20 1.19 1.16 **  Western countries 2G Other countries 0.60 0.62 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.62 **  Native 1 ** N(events) 9,321(6,609)  Cohabitation (Censoring at marriage) 1G Maghreb 0.59 *** 0.49 *** 0.515 *** 0.60 *** 0.64 *** 0.57 *** 1.6 South East Asia 0.61 *** 0.56 *** 0.58 *** 0.61 *** 0.62 *** 1.08 *** 1.02 1.08 *** 1.09 1.10 1.18 ** 1.24 *** 1.24 *** 1.24 *** 1.24 *** 1.24 *** 1.24 *** 1.24 *** 1.24 *** 1.24 *** 1.24 *** 1.24 *** 1.24 *** 1.25 *** 1.24 *** 1.25 *** 1.24 *** 1.26 *	2G Africa	1.59	*	1.56	*	1.55	*	1.56	*	1.26	
2G Southern Europe	2G South East Asia	0.70		0.79		0.88		0.89		0.89	
2G Other EU & 1.07 1.11 1.20 1.19 1.16  Western countries 2G Other countries 0.60 0.62 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.62  Native 1 N(events) 9,321(6,609)  Cohabitation (Censoring at marriage) 1G Maghreb 0.59 *** 0.49 *** 0.515 *** 0.60 *** 0.64 *** 0.57 *** 1G South East Asia 0.61 *** 0.56 *** 0.58 *** 0.61 *** 0.62 *** 1G Turkey 0.99 0.79 *** 0.84 *** 1.02 1.08  1G Southern Europe 1.23 *** 1.09 1.10 1.18 ** 1.24 *** 1.24 *** 1G Other EU & 0.93 0.88 0.92 1.25 ** 1.24 *** 1.24 *** 1G Other countries 0.69 *** 0.58 *** 0.64 *** 0.54 *** 0.57 *** 1G Other countries 0.69 *** 0.58 *** 0.64 *** 0.54 *** 0.57 *** 1.24 *** 1G Other countries 0.69 *** 0.58 *** 0.64 *** 0.54 *** 0.57 *** 1.24 *** 1G Other countries 0.69 *** 0.55 *** 0.56 *** 0.54 *** 0.54 *** 0.57 *** 1.24 *** 1G Other countries 0.50 *** 0.50 *** 0.54 *** 0.54 *** 0.57 *** 1.24 *** 1G Other countries 0.50 *** 0.50 *** 0.54 *** 0.54 *** 0.57 *** 1.24 *** 1G Other countries 0.50 *** 0.50 *** 0.56 *** 0.54 *** 0.57 *** 0.57 *** 1.24 *** 1.24 *** 1.25 ** 0.56 *** 0.57 *** 0.57 *** 1.24 *** 1.25 ** 0.56 *** 0.57 *** 0.57 *** 0.57 *** 1.24 *** 1.25 ** 0.56 *** 0.57	2G Turkey	6.17	***	5.98	***	5.51	***	5.57	***	4.38	***
Western countries         0.60         0.62         0.69         0.69         0.62           Native         1         N(events)         9,321(6,609)         0.69         0.69         0.62           Cohabitation (Censoring at marriage)           1G Maghreb         0.59         ***         0.49         ***         0.515         ***         0.60         ***         0.64         ***           1G Africa         0.54         ***         0.46         ***         0.47         ***         0.54         ***         0.57         ***           1G South East Asia         0.61         ***         0.56         ***         0.58         ***         0.61         ***         0.62         ***           1G Turkey         0.99         0.79         ***         0.84         ***         1.02         1.08         ***           1G Other EU &         0.93         0.88         0.92         1.25         **         1.24         ***           Western countries         0.69         ***         0.58         ***         0.64         ***         0.77         ***         0.80         ***           2G Maghreb         0.55         ***         0.56         ***	2G Southern Europe	0.75		0.74		0.72	*	0.72	*	0.67	**
2G Other countries       0.60       0.62       0.69       0.69       0.62         Native N(events)       9,321(6,609)       0.69       0.69       0.62         Cohabitation (Censoring at marriage)         1G Maghreb       0.59       ***       0.49       ***       0.515       ***       0.60       ***       0.64       ***         1G Africa       0.54       ***       0.46       ***       0.47       ***       0.54       ***       0.57       ***         1G South East Asia       0.61       ***       0.56       ***       0.58       ***       0.61       ***       0.62       ***         1G Turkey       0.99       0.79       ***       0.84       ***       1.02       1.08       **         1G Other Eu &       0.93       0.88       0.92       1.25       **       1.24       **         1G Other countries       0.69       ***       0.58       ***       0.64       ***       0.77       ***       0.80       ***         2G Maghreb       0.55       ***       0.58       ***       0.64       ***       0.57       ***         2G South East Asia       0.59       ***       0.67 </th <th>2G Other EU &amp;</th> <th>1.07</th> <th></th> <th>1.11</th> <th></th> <th>1.20</th> <th></th> <th>1.19</th> <th></th> <th>1.16</th> <th></th>	2G Other EU &	1.07		1.11		1.20		1.19		1.16	
Native 1 N(events) 9,321(6,609)  Cohabitation (Censoring at marriage)  1G Maghreb 0.59 *** 0.49 *** 0.515 *** 0.60 *** 0.64 ***  1G Africa 0.54 *** 0.46 *** 0.47 *** 0.54 *** 0.57 ***  1G South East Asia 0.61 *** 0.56 *** 0.58 *** 0.61 *** 0.62 ***  1G Turkey 0.99 0.79 *** 0.84 *** 1.02 1.08 ***  1G Southern Europe 1.23 *** 1.09 1.10 1.18 ** 1.24 ***  1G Other EU & 0.93 0.88 0.92 1.25 ** 1.24 ***  Western countries  1G Other countries 0.69 *** 0.58 *** 0.64 *** 0.77 *** 0.80 ***  2G Maghreb 0.55 *** 0.56 *** 0.54 *** 0.54 *** 0.57 ***  2G Africa 0.50 *** 0.49 *** 0.48 *** 0.48 *** 0.51 ***  2G South East Asia 0.59 *** 0.67 *** 0.66 *** 0.66 *** 0.66 ***  2G Turkey 0.61 *** 0.58 *** 0.56 *** 0.56 *** 0.57 *** 0.61 ***  2G Southern Europe 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98  2G Other EU & 1.10 1.16 ** 1.18 ** 1.17 ** 1.17 ***  Western countries	Western countries										
N(events)       9,321(6,609)         Cohabitation (Censoring at marriage)         1G Maghreb       0.59       ***       0.49       ***       0.515       ***       0.60       ***       0.64       ***         1G Africa       0.54       ***       0.46       ***       0.47       ***       0.54       ***       0.57       ***         1G South East Asia       0.61       ***       0.56       ***       0.58       ***       0.61       ***       0.62       ***         1G Turkey       0.99       0.79       ***       0.84       ***       1.02       1.08       ***         1G Southern Europe       1.23       ***       1.09       1.10       1.18       ***       1.24       ***         1G Other EU &       0.93       0.88       0.92       1.25       **       1.24       ***         Western countries       0.69       ***       0.58       ***       0.64       ***       0.77       ***       0.80       ***         2G Maghreb       0.55       ***       0.56       ***       0.54       ***       0.54       ***       0.54       ***       0.54       ***       0.54<	2G Other countries	0.60		0.62		0.69		0.69		0.62	
Cohabitation (Censoring at marriage)  1G Maghreb	Native	1									
1G Maghreb       0.59       ****       0.49       ****       0.515       ****       0.60       ****       0.64       ****         1G Africa       0.54       ****       0.46       ****       0.47       ****       0.54       ****       0.57       ****         1G South East Asia       0.61       ****       0.56       ***       0.58       ****       0.61       ****       0.62       ****         1G Turkey       0.99       0.79       ***       0.84       ***       1.02       1.08       ***         1G Southern Europe       1.23       ****       1.09       1.10       1.18       ***       1.24       ****         1G Other EU &       0.93       0.88       0.92       1.25       ***       1.24       ***         Western countries       0.69       ****       0.58       ****       0.64       ****       0.77       ****       0.80       ****         2G Maghreb       0.55       ****       0.56       ***       0.54       ****       0.54       ****       0.57       ****         2G South East Asia       0.59       ****       0.67       ***       0.66       ***       0.66       **** </th <th>N(events)</th> <th>9,321(6,609)</th> <th>)</th> <th></th> <th></th> <th></th> <th></th> <th></th> <th></th> <th></th> <th></th>	N(events)	9,321(6,609)	)								
1G Africa	Cohabitation (Censori	ng at marriag	e)								
1G South East Asia	1G Maghreb	0.59	***	0.49	***	0.515	***	0.60	***	0.64	***
1G Turkey       0.99       0.79       ****       0.84       ****       1.02       1.08         1G Southern Europe       1.23       ****       1.09       1.10       1.18       ***       1.24       ****         1G Other EU &       0.93       0.88       0.92       1.25       ***       1.24       ***         Western countries       0.69       ****       0.58       ***       0.64       ***       0.77       ***       0.80       ***         2G Maghreb       0.55       ***       0.56       ***       0.54       ***       0.54       ***       0.57       ***         2G Africa       0.50       ***       0.49       ***       0.48       ***       0.48       ***       0.51       ***         2G South East Asia       0.59       ***       0.67       ***       0.66       ***       0.66       ***       0.66       ***         2G Southern Europe       0.99       0.97       0.97       0.98       0.98       0.98         2G Other EU &       1.10       1.16       **       1.18       **       1.17       **       1.17       **	1G Africa	0.54	***	0.46	***	0.47	***	0.54	***	0.57	***
1G Southern Europe       1.23       ***       1.09       1.10       1.18       ***       1.24       ***         1G Other EU &       0.93       0.88       0.92       1.25       **       1.24       ***         Western countries       0.69       ***       0.58       ***       0.64       ***       0.77       ***       0.80       ***         2G Maghreb       0.55       ***       0.56       ***       0.54       ***       0.54       ***       0.57       ***         2G Africa       0.50       ***       0.49       ***       0.48       ***       0.48       ***       0.51       ***         2G South East Asia       0.59       ***       0.67       ***       0.66       ***       0.66       ***       0.66       ***         2G Southern Europe       0.99       0.97       0.97       0.98       0.98       0.98         2G Other EU &       1.10       1.16       **       1.18       **       1.17       **       1.17       **         Western countries       ***       1.10       **       1.16       **       1.18       **       1.17       **       1.17       **	1G South East Asia	0.61	***	0.56	***	0.58	***	0.61	***	0.62	***
1G Other EU & 0.93 0.88 0.92 1.25 ** 1.24 **  Western countries  1G Other countries  1G Other countries  0.69 *** 0.58 *** 0.64 *** 0.77 *** 0.80 ***  2G Maghreb 0.55 *** 0.56 *** 0.54 *** 0.54 *** 0.57 ***  2G Africa 0.50 *** 0.49 *** 0.48 *** 0.48 *** 0.51 ***  2G South East Asia 0.59 *** 0.67 *** 0.66 *** 0.66 *** 0.66 ***  2G Turkey 0.61 *** 0.58 *** 0.56 *** 0.57 *** 0.61 ***  2G Southern Europe 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98  2G Other EU & 1.10 1.16 ** 1.18 ** 1.17 ** 1.17 **  Western countries	1G Turkey	0.99		0.79	***	0.84	***	1.02		1.08	
Western countries       0.69       ***       0.58       ***       0.64       ***       0.77       ***       0.80       ***         2G Maghreb       0.55       ***       0.56       ***       0.54       ***       0.54       ***       0.57       ***         2G Africa       0.50       ***       0.49       ***       0.48       ***       0.48       ***       0.51       ***         2G South East Asia       0.59       ***       0.67       ***       0.66       ***       0.66       ***       0.66       ***       0.66       ***       0.66       ***       0.61       ***       0.58       ***       0.56       ***       0.57       ***       0.61       ***         2G Southern Europe       0.99       0.97       0.97       0.98       0.98       0.98         2G Other EU &       1.10       1.16       **       1.18       **       1.17       **       1.17       **         Western countries       ***       ***       ***       ***       ***       **       ***       **       ***       **       ***       **       ***       **       ***       **       **       **       **	1G Southern Europe	1.23	***	1.09		1.10		1.18	**	1.24	***
1G Other countries       0.69       ***       0.58       ***       0.64       ***       0.77       ***       0.80       ***         2G Maghreb       0.55       ***       0.56       ***       0.54       ***       0.54       ***       0.57       ***         2G Africa       0.50       ***       0.49       ***       0.48       ***       0.48       ***       0.51       ***         2G South East Asia       0.59       ***       0.67       ***       0.66       ***       0.66       ***       0.66       ***       0.66       ***       0.66       ***       0.61       ***       0.58       ***       0.56       ***       0.57       ***       0.61       ***         2G Southern Europe       0.99       0.97       0.97       0.98       0.98       0.98         2G Other EU &       1.10       1.16       **       1.18       **       1.17       **       1.17       **         Western countries	1G Other EU &	0.93		0.88		0.92		1.25	**	1.24	**
2G Maghreb 0.55 *** 0.56 *** 0.54 *** 0.54 *** 0.57 ***  2G Africa 0.50 *** 0.49 *** 0.48 *** 0.48 *** 0.51 ***  2G South East Asia 0.59 *** 0.67 *** 0.66 *** 0.66 *** 0.66 ***  2G Turkey 0.61 *** 0.58 *** 0.56 *** 0.57 *** 0.61 ***  2G Southern Europe 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98  2G Other EU & 1.10 1.16 ** 1.18 ** 1.17 ** 1.17 **  Western countries											
2G Africa       0.50       ***       0.49       ***       0.48       ***       0.48       ***       0.51       ***         2G South East Asia       0.59       ***       0.67       ***       0.66       ***       0.66       ***       0.66       ***         2G Turkey       0.61       ***       0.58       ***       0.56       ***       0.57       ***       0.61       ***         2G Southern Europe       0.99       0.97       0.97       0.98       0.98       0.98         2G Other EU &       1.10       1.16       **       1.18       **       1.17       **       1.17       **         Western countries		0.69		0.58				0.77		0.80	***
2G South East Asia       0.59       ***       0.67       ***       0.66       ***       0.66       ***         2G Turkey       0.61       ***       0.58       ***       0.56       ***       0.57       ***       0.61       ***         2G Southern Europe       0.99       0.97       0.97       0.98       0.98       0.98         2G Other EU &       1.10       1.16       **       1.18       **       1.17       **       1.17       **         Western countries	_										***
2G Turkey       0.61       ***       0.58       ***       0.56       ***       0.57       ***       0.61       ***         2G Southern Europe       0.99       0.97       0.97       0.98       0.98         2G Other EU &       1.10       1.16       **       1.18       **       1.17       **       1.17       **         Western countries		0.50		0.49		0.48				0.51	***
2G Southern Europe       0.99       0.97       0.97       0.98       0.98         2G Other EU &       1.10       1.16       **       1.18       **       1.17       **         Western countries					***		***		***		***
2G Other EU & 1.10 1.16 ** 1.18 ** 1.17 ** Western countries	-	0.61	***	0.58	***	0.56	***		***		***
Western countries	2G Southern Europe										
		1.10		1.16	**	1.18	**	1.17	**	1.17	**
<b>2G Other countries</b> $0.71.8**$ $0.72.8**$ $0.74.8**$ $0.74.8**$											
	2G Other countries	0.71	***	0.73	***	0.74	***	0.74	***	0.75	***
<b>Native</b> 1 1 1 1 1		•		1		1		1		1	
<b>N(events)</b> 9,321(6,609)	N(events)	9,321(6,609)	)								

Model 1: controlled for migration status and cohort.

Model 2: additionally controlled for pregnancy status.

Model 3: additionally controlled for level of education and activity status.

Model 4: additionally controlled for migration history

Model 5: additionally controlled for social background and religiosity. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 10. First cohabitation/marriage as competing risks, women by country of origin

	Model	1	Model	2	Model	3	Model	4	Mode	el 5
Marriage (Censoring a	t cohabitati	ion)								
1G Maghreb	4.93	***	4.43	***	2.92	***	2.38	***	2.01	***
1G Africa	3.43	***	3.34	***	1.92	***	1.47	***	1.32	*
1G South East Asia	1.69	***	1.60	***	1.23		0.99		0.94	
1G Turkey	9.78	***	9.18	***	5.54	***	4.45	***	3.87	***
1G Southern Europe	2.48	***	2.36	***	1.89	***	1.53	***	1.32	*
1G Other EU &	1.67	***	1.57	**	1.57	**	1.17		1.16	
Western countries										
1G Other countries	2.06	***	2.01	***	1.53	***	1.18		1.10	
2G Maghreb	2.76	***	2.80	***	2.40	***	2.44	***	2.08	***
2G Africa	1.42	*	1.61	***	1.28		1.31		1.18	
2G South East Asia	0.88		1.00		0.94		0.96		0.94	
2G Turkey	6.38	***	6.86	***	5.07	***	5.25	***	4.41	***
2G Southern Europe	0.88		0.90		0.84		0.84		0.79	
2G Other EU &	0.81		0.80		0.80		0.81		0.81	
Western countries										
2G Other countries	0.96		1.01		0.99		1.00		0.96	
Native	1		1		1		1		1	
N(events)	10440(811	0)								
Cohabitation (Censoria	ng at marria	age)								
1G Maghreb	0.63	***	0.55	***	0.47	***	0.53	***	0.54	***
1G Africa	0.54	***	0.52	***	0.40	***	0.42	***	0.44	***
1G South East Asia	0.69	***	0.65	***	0.59	***	0.62	***	0.62	***
1G Turkey	1.14	*	1.05		0.83	***	0.89	**	0.90	
1G Southern Europe	1.06		1.01		0.88	***	0.88	**	0.89	**
1G Other EU &	0.90	**	0.83	***	0.93	*	1.05		1.08	
Western countries										
1G Other countries	0.71	***	0.68	***	0.64	***	0.73	***	0.74	***
2G Maghreb	0.55	***	0.55	***	0.51	***	0.52	***	0.52	***
2G Africa	0.44	***	0.50	***	0.44	***	0.44	***	0.46	***
2G South East Asia	0.73	***	0.84	*	0.82		0.82		0.84	*
2G Turkey	0.60	***	0.63	***	0.52	***	0.54	***	0.56	***
2G Southern Europe	0.91	**	0.93	*	0.88	***	0.89	**	0.89	***
2G Other EU &	0.89		0.88	**	0.92		0.91		0.93	
Western countries										
2G Other countries	0.71	***	0.75	***	0.75	***	0.76	***	0.78	***
Native	1		1		1		1		1	
N(events)	10,440(8,1	4.0\								


Model 1: controlled for migration status and cohort.

Model 2: additionally controlled for pregnancy status.

Model 3: additionally controlled for level of education and activity status.

Model 4: additionally controlled for migration history

Model 5: additionally controlled for social background and religiosity. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1






Figure 4. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of entering into first separation, by sex and origin

Table 11. Relative risk of first separation, by origin and sex

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Men					
First Generation	0.73 ***	0.90 *	0.90	0.93	0.98
Second	1.08	1.13 *	1.14 **	1.14 *	1.18 ***
Generation					
Native	1	1	1	1	1
N(events)	6,602 (1,687)				
Women					
First Generation	0.71 ***	0.75 ***	0.82 ***	0.88 *	0.91 ***
Second	1.12 **	1.16 **	1.18 ***	1.17 ***	1.22 ***
Generation					
Native	1	1	1	1	1
N(events)	8,104 (2,295)				

Model 1: controlled for migration status and cohort.

Model 2: additionally controlled for pregnancy status, age at first union formation, type of first union (direct marriage, indirect marriage or cohabitation.

Model 3: additionally controlled for level of education and activity status.

Model 4: additionally controlled for migration history

Model 5: additionally controlled for social background and religiosity.

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 12. Relative risk of first separation, by country of origin and sex

	Mod	lel 1	Model 2		Mod	lel 3	Mod	lel 4	Mod	lel 5
Men										
1G Maghreb	0.77	***	1.04		1.06		1.17		1.23	*
1G Africa	1.00		1.40	***	1.41	***	1.58	***	1.60	***
1G South East Asia	0.61	***	0.74	**	0.74	**	0.79		0.81	
1G Turkey	0.26	***	0.33	***	0.34	***	0.38	***	0.42	***
1G Southern Europe	0.65	***	0.69	***	0.71	***	0.75	***	0.79	**
1G Other EU &	1.47	***	1.38	***	1.38	***	1.53	***	1.48	***
Western countries										
1G Other countries	0.78	**	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.11	
2G Maghreb	0.99		1.16		1.18		1.18		1.23	*
2G Africa	1.03		1.18		1.17		1.17		1.15	
2G South East Asia	1.39		1.32		1.32		1.32		1.35	
2G Turkey	0.56	**	0.85		0.86		0.86		0.92	
2G Southern Europe	0.98		1.00		1.01		1.01		1.05	
2G Other EU &	1.47	***	1.42	***	1.41	***	1.41	***	1.40	***
Western countries										
2G Other countries	1.55	***	1.52	**	1.52	**	1.51	**	1.54	**
Native	1		1		1		1		1	
N(events)	6,602 (	(1,687)								
Women										
1G Maghreb	0.62	***	0.67	***	0.77	***	0.93		0.98	
1G Africa	1.02		1.11		1.24	**	1.55	***	1.59	***
1G South East Asia	0.54	***	0.56	***	0.61	***	0.70	***	0.69	***
1G Turkey	0.20	***	0.20	***	0.23	***	0.28	***	0.30	***
1G Southern Europe	0.57	***	0.58	***	0.62	***	0.70	***	0.76	***
1G Other EU &	1.20	**	1.18	*	1.21	**	1.55	***	1.45	***
Western countries										
1G Other countries	0.87		0.90		0.97		1.26	*	1.23	*
2G Maghreb	1.15	*	1.25	***	1.30	***	1.29	***	1.37	***
2G Africa	2.04	***	2.03	***	2.06	***	2.04	***	2.06	***
2G South East Asia	1.30		1.25		1.26		1.25		1.32	
2G Turkey	0.83		1.02		1.09		1.07		1.16	
2G Southern Europe	0.97		0.98		0.99		0.99		1.03	
2G Other EU &	1.34	***	1.32	**	1.34	***	1.33	***	1.34	***
Western countries	4.04		4.05		4.00		4.00		4.04	
2G Other countries	1.24		1.25		1.26		1.26		1.24	
Native	1	(0.005)	1		1		1		1	
N(events)	8,104 (	, ,								


Model 1: controlled for migration status and cohort.


Model 2: additionally controlled for pregnancy status, age at first union formation, type of first union (direct marriage, indirect marriage or cohabitation.


Model 3: additionally controlled for level of education and activity status.


Model 4: additionally controlled for migration history

Model 5: additionally controlled for social background and religiosity. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1













Figures appendix 1. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of entering into first union, by sex and detailed origin













Source: Calculations based on TeO 2008

Figures Appendix 2. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of entering into first marriage, by sex and detailed origin









Source: Calculations based on TeO 2008

Figures Appendix 3. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of entering into first separation, by sex and detailed origin

# **Union Formation Among Immigrants and Their Descendants in Switzerland**

Andrés Guarin and Laura Bernardi

#### Abstract:

Drawing on data from the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), we examine first union formation among immigrants and their descendants by comparing their behaviour to that of the 'native' population in Switzerland. The empirical evidence shows that there are differences in the timing of union formation between immigrants and the Swiss natives. Within the immigrant group, we also observe differences between those who arrived in Switzerland as adults and their descendants, who have been born or socialized in Switzerland from very early ages. The formation of a first union among the descendants of immigrants occurs later than among immigrants. This supports the adaptation (integration) hypothesis: through generations, social norms of the host country are adopted and integrated in union behaviour of individuals with a migrant background.

Keywords: immigrants, the second-generation migrants, marriage, Switzerland.

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## 1. Background

Studying the timing of union formation helps us to understand and measure the significance of this transition for later life course developments both - for family trajectory and for professional and trajectories (Elder et al. 2003; Holland & De Valk 2013). Recent developments in international migration and union formation make it difficult to establish a single and unidirectional relationship between family dynamics and integration of immigrants (Macmillan 2005; Widmer & Ritschard 2009). For instance, the de-standardization of family forms has increased among immigrants and ethnic minorities as it has among native populations (De Valk 2011; Kulu & Gonzalez-Ferrer 2013; Kulu & Milewski 2007). There has been a large amount of research on family transitions among immigrants in Europe; e.g. mixed marriages between natives and migrants (Dribe & Lundh 2012; González-Ferrer 2006; Milewski & Kulu 2013; Smith et al. 2012), labour market performance and professional situation (Andréo 2001; Billari & Liefbroer 2010; Bolzman et al. 2003; Dahinden 2005; Gauthier 2007; Settersten 2005), and economic integration of immigrants (Alba 1985; Portes 1994). Research has focused also on children of immigrants; Fertility of these immigrant descendants (Milewski 2011), their transition to parenthood (Scott & Stanfors 2011), school contextual effects (Portes & Hao 2004), adaptation process in early adulthood (Bolzman et al. 2003; Portes & Rumbaut 2005; Rumbaut 2005; Santelli 2007), professional trajectories after school (Portes 2005; Sweet et al. 2010) and economic performance (Algan et al. 2010).

Early theories, such as the melting-pot approach by Park and Milton Gordon (1964) and that by Gans (1970), amongst others, were developed to understand the mechanisms of integration of immigrants and their descendants in different trajectories of life. Afterwards, this theory was partially replaced by the theory of segmented assimilation (Portes & Zhou 1993). Research revealed social and economic disadvantages for the first generation immigrants, which tend to decrease in the following generations. The second and third generation immigrants have undergone a linear process of assimilation, which permitted their structural integration into society. There are other circumstances that can influence the assimilation process, originating from the model of segmented assimilation (Portes & Zhou 1993), such as the quality of education (academic or professional), the substitution of the old wave of immigration by new waves or economic conditions. Yet, this study demonstrates the possibility of the marginalization of specific immigrant groups, while others are integrated successfully (Canales 2000; Guarnizo & Smith 1999; Levitt 2004; Portes 2005). In

comparison to the US case, differences within ethnic groups play an important role in Europe. Further, the significance of the national context for integration pathways has received more attention (Crul & Vermeulen 2003; Doomernik 1998; Fibbi *et al.* 2010; Lucassen 2005). In fact, the authors argue that participation and the feeling of belonging for immigrants in European cities is highly dependent on the integration context and membership in a specific ethnic group (Schneider & Crul 2012).

In regards to union formation, there is a large share of research on immigrant's families, focusing on childbearing behaviour, which is closely linked to first union formation. This research proposes three main mechanisms to explain the integration of immigrants and their descendants9, or the lack thereof; a) the socialisation mechanism suggests that family trajectories of immigrants are influenced by values, norms and behavioural patterns to which they are exposed during childhood (Kulu & Milewski 2007; Kulu & Gonzalez-Ferrer 2013); b) the adaptation mechanism, where the family behaviour of migrants will converge (in a medium rather than a long-term perspective) towards that of the population of the host society (Andersson 2004; Andersson & Scott 2005; Kulu & Gonzalez-Ferrer 2013); and c) the selection hypothesis, which suggests that the behaviour of immigrant families is different from the behaviour of the population in their home country, as they have left that social environment for another (Andersson 2004; Kulu & Milewski 2007; Kulu & Gonzalez-Ferrer 2013). To study union formation among immigrants and their descendants the different approaches need to be considered. It is important to investigate which pattern is followed by immigrants at first union formation, that of the country of origin or that of the new country. We need also to take into account, when explaining the differences between secondgeneration immigrants and 'natives' that both groups have been socially influenced by the host country.

The aim of this report is to examine first union formation (cohabitation and marriage) among immigrants and their descendants by comparing their patterns to the 'native' population of Switzerland. More precisely, we want to understand if immigrant population (with diverse origins) have different patterns of first union formation than natives, and if there is a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> This mechanism will be better presented in the article. For resume on this topic you can see Kulu and Gonzalez-Ferrer (2013), where they present an excellent state-of-the-art report of hypotheses that could be explain the differences between immigrant population and natives.

difference between first generation and second generation immigrants. Additionally, we want to test if the differences between immigrant population and the native population can be explained by one of the mechanisms presented above. Comparing immigrants' and natives' union behaviour will shed light on the degree of integration of immigrants into the host society.

Firstly, we provide an historic overview of immigration in Switzerland. In the following section, we first present the available data for studying the union formation of immigrants with different ethnic origins and elaborate on challenges this data presents to research on union dynamics. In this section we also present the methodology used in this study. In the third section we display descriptive findings and the results of event history analyses for union formation (cohabitation and marriage) of immigrant population and their descendants as well as the native population.

## 1.1. Immigrants in Switzerland

In the decades after the Second World War, the massive influx of "temporary" immigrants in response to a lack of workers, led to the founding of a large immigrant community in most countries of Western Europe (Coleman 2006; Mens 2006). The children of those immigrants, commonly referred to as "second-generation" immigrants, are educated and socialized in the host country of their parents (Crul & Mollenkopf 2012). The history of immigration is reflected as well in the Swiss population, according to the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO), in 1910 the proportion of foreigners in Switzerland was 14.7%. This percentage increased in 1967, when numerous immigrants from Italy and Spain came to Switzerland (Fibbi *et al.* 1999). After that, a workforce from the Balkans, France, Germany and Turkey joined the group of immigrants who had arrived previously in Switzerland (Fibbi et al. 2007).

Bilateral agreements govern the entry and residence of these temporary "guest-workers", of whom many eventually settled and became a part of the Swiss society (Fibbi *et al.* 2007). Until the 1970's, Swiss laws controlled the entry of immigrants, and they intended the "rotation" of immigrants, instead of "permanent" immigration. In the mid-1970's, there was a change in policy, now focussing more on integration, which made family reunification possible and enabled promotion for foreign workers, trying to stop the segmentation of the labour market (Fibbi *et al.* 2009). With the exception of a decrease in immigration between

1975 and 1979 and a slight decline in 1983, the proportion of foreigners in Switzerland has continuously increased (Bader & Fibbi 2012).

In 2012 about 34% of the Swiss population have immigrant origins, of which four-fifth have European origins. The largest immigrant group in Switzerland is from Italy, followed by immigrants from Germany and Portugal (FSO 2014). Currently, most immigrants arriving in Switzerland come from Former Yugoslavia (including successor countries), followed by immigrants from Turkey and Sri Lanka (Fibbi 2009).

In the beginning of the 1970's immigration to Switzerland can be explained by the economic growth. In the 1980's however, the reasons why immigrants came to Switzerland diverged, people emigrated because of external political factors (asylum seekers) and immigrant workers who had come to Switzerland by the end of the 1970's reunited with their families (Fibbi *et al.* 2007; Wanner *et al.* 2004). The high proportion of foreigners in Switzerland is however also partially a result of the restrictive naturalization policy, a high birth rate amongst immigrants and their low mortality rate (Fibbi *et al.* 2009).

#### 1.2. First union formation in Switzerland

In Europe marriage rates started declining first in the mid-1960's among the Scandinavian countries and later this tendency spread to Western and Southern Europe (Charton & Wanner 2001) although those trends varied by country (Sobotka *et al.* 2012). In Switzerland, the FSO shows that between 1870 and 1940 women married for the first time at the age of 26 and men two years later. Later on, between 1940 and 1970 people married at an earlier age, the average age fell by two years (Federal Statistical Office 2014)<sup>10</sup>. In 2012, men and women were in average older when they first married; the average age increased by five years compared to 1971. The difference in age of men and women who marry for the first time has been stable since the 1950's, on average men are around 2 years older than women when they marry for the first time (FSO 2014).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> In wed side of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, we can find the average age distributed by cantons in Switzerland. http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/themen/01/06/blank/key/05/04.html

According to Charton and Wanner (2000), more than 80% of Swiss women born in the 1930's were married before reaching the age of 50, for women born in the 1960's this percentage dropped to less than 70%. By the end of the 20st century, other forms of unions gained popularity in Switzerland: the number of unmarried partners increased between 1980 and 1990 (Charton & Wanner 2000). This trend could not only be observed in Switzerland, similar developments took place in the neighbouring Western European countries like France and Germany (Fibbi & Wanner 2009). However, there have been very little studies focussing on the relationship between family and immigration and on the changes in family forms among immigrants and their descendants (Fibbi & Wanner 2009).

## 2. Data and methods

For our study we used the data of the Swiss Household Panel (SHP)<sup>11</sup>. The SHP collects longitudinal data on a variety of life course dimensions like union, family, residence, health, education, profession and subjective indicators on norms and values. It therefore represents an invaluable source of information to study union and family dynamics from a life course perspective. Data collection started in 1999 with a sample of 5,074 households containing 12,931 individuals. In 2004 a second sample of 2,538 households with a total of 6,569 household members was added. The SHP database currently holds longitudinal information for the years 1999 to 2011.

The only limitation for the current study is that the SHP had not, until 2013<sup>12</sup>, targeted the immigrant population or its descendants during the sampling process. This means that some of analyses are limited by the small number of available cases. There are a few modelling choices we had to make in order to target and compare the populations of interest, namely; a) defining first and second-generations, b) identifying the timing of transitions in and out of a union and durations in different first union states (married and cohabiting), and c) distinguishing immigrants of different origins.

a) Definition of population subgroups: We constructed the variable "Origin" that allowed us to identify the ethnic origin of respondents. This is a combination of the dummy variable

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> This part of the document uses the information of the Swiss House Panel <a href="http://www.swisspanel.ch/spip.php?rubrique127&lang=en">http://www.swisspanel.ch/spip.php?rubrique127&lang=en</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> From the 2013, the SHP includes a subsample of the descendants of immigrants, but data are not yet available since the end of February 2014.

"being born in Switzerland" (yes/no), having moved to Switzerland before the age of 15<sup>13</sup> and the nationality of the parents. In a large number of cases, about 1/3 of our sample, we did not have any information about the nationality of the father. In these cases, we used the nationality of the respondent as proxy, in order to keep these cases in the study. There was a high risk of losing large percentages of naturalized foreign individuals otherwise. In our sample, the proportions of the populations did not change after inclusion of the recoded N.A. cases. After these modifications, the research population is divided into "native" Swiss, immigrants (the 'first generation') and their descendants (the 'second-generation') <sup>14</sup>.

b) Identification of the union status and the timing of transition from one to the other: We generated a variable that indicates whether the person is married, or whether he or she cohabits. For the first generation immigrants we did not take into account if their marriage occurred before or after arriving in Switzerland. In this study we do not analyze transitions of divorce or second union formation, because data limitations do not allow such an investigation due to small case numbers, especially among the immigrant groups.

c) Disaggregation of the variable "origin" according to origins: even though comparing patterns of union formation for immigrants of different origins would be certainly informative, in the regression analyses we do not reach sufficient sample sizes to estimate robust coefficients (table 1).

#### (Table 1 about here)

The research methodology involves two steps: first we present descriptive analyses (with the variable "origins" disaggregated), median ages and Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of entering into first cohabitation and first marriage. Secondly, we applied event-history analyses (Cox models) for the analyses of union transitions. We analyse first union formation and distinguished between first cohabitation and first marriage by partially aggregating

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Analyses were performed for the children of immigrants who arrived before the age of 10 and 6 and the results of the analyses are practically identical.

<sup>14</sup> Natives are individuals who themselves and whose parents have the Swiss nationality. If at least one of the parents did not have the Swiss nationality; an individual was classified as a descendant of immigrant(s). If a descendant of immigrant(s) had parents of different origin, priority was given to the father's country of birth.

immigrants by origin<sup>15</sup>. Our modelling strategy is straightforward and follows the guidelines for the country case studies of the FamiliesAndSocieties project. For each transition investigated in the study, we estimated a series of main effect models and monitor the change in the effects of the independent variable. The first model M1 includes the independent variable "origins" (immigrant status/generation) and the birth cohort. In M2, we add controls on educational attainment (low, medium, high) of respondents. For M2 we add controls variables using a stepwise procedure. For all events regarding union formation (cohabitation or marriage), the common starting age at risk is age 17<sup>16</sup>. Cases are right-censored either at the last known interview date, or at age 45.

## 3. Results

We will present three kinds of results here: the first set of results contrasts patterns by first union and by type (cohabitation or marriage), the second set of results focuses on the differences between men and women, and the third focuses on the differences between Swiss natives, first generation immigrants, and second-generation immigrants.

## 3.1. Median age and survival analysis

The median age of *first union* formation for men and women is presented in tables 2 and 3. Not surprisingly, the median age of men at first union formation is higher than for women for all origins. The age of first union formation for native men is 26.6 and for women 24.2. If we take a look at the differences between the immigrant origins, we see that the median age for second-generation immigrants tends to be similar to natives. Yet, male first generation immigrants with Western European origin have a higher median age than the natives, while first generation immigrants with Former Yugoslavia and Turkish origins (men and women) have a lower median age than the natives. Another important aspect to be reported is that the second-generation immigrants with Former Yugoslavia and Turkish origins have the highest

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> According to the results that we obtained separately for "each" of the origins, we decided to combine the results by; Southern Europa (Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece), Europe (Belgium, Denmark and territories, Finland, UK, Ireland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands and territories, Norway and territories, Austria, Rumania, Sweden, Poland, Hungary Slovakia, Czech Republic, Malta, Monaco), Former Yugoslavia-Turkey (Albania, Yugoslavia, Serbia-Montenegro Croatia Slovenia Bosnia-Herzegovina Macedonia Ex-Republic of Yugoslavia Kosovo), and others (where the main countries are Russia, United States and territories, Sri Lanka, India and Lebanon).

<sup>16</sup> We decided to start the risk age of first union (cohabitation and marriage) at 17 years because we do not have many cases that start the first union before 17. And because in Switzerland the age of majority is 18 since 1st January 1996 (Art.14 of the Civil Code). Before this date the age varied between each canton.

median age among their counterparts of other origins and that their median age is higher than the median age of immigrants of the first generation of similar origins.

(Table 2 about here)

(Table 3 about here)

Tables 4 and 5 show the differences between the median age of *first cohabitation* for men and women and tables 6 and 7 show *first marriage* by immigrant origin for men and women. Here we can see that the median age of first marriage is higher than the age of cohabitation, for all origins (men and women). These differences are more evident among the natives (cohabitation: Men = 24.7, Women = 22.1; Marriage: Men=27.5, Women = 25.1) and men with Southern Europe origins. If we take a look at the differences between the immigrant origins, we see that the median age (cohabitation and marriage) for second-generation immigrants tends to be higher than the natives. Yet, Western European immigrants and immigrants of other origins have a higher median age than the natives, while immigrants with Former Yugoslavia and Turkish origins have a lower median age than the natives, both for *cohabitation* and *marriage*.

(Table 4 about here)

(Table 5 about here)

(Table 6 about here)

(Table 7 about here)

In view of these results we can see two different population groups; a) a first one that tends to have a higher median age (cohabitation and marriage) than natives. This group is composed of all groups of second-generation immigrants and of the immigrants with Western European origins and immigrants of other origins, and b) the second group that is composed of the immigrants with Former Yugoslavia and Turkish origins and immigrants with Southern Europe origins; they tend to have a lower median age (cohabitation and marriage) than natives. However, we must interpret the results concerning the second-generation immigrants

with Former Yugoslavia origins with care, given the small sample of this group in our database.

The survival analysis helps visualize the differences in the median ages at entering first union and timing of this transition. Figure 1 and 2 show the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of entering into *first union* by origin for men (Figure 1) and for women (Figure 2). Here we can see that, similar to what we observed through the median age, men go into first union later than women. We can also observe that first generation immigrants with Former Yugoslavia and Turkish (purple line) and with South-European (blue line) origins, both men and women, enter earlier a first union than natives (black line). These differences are more pronounced for women. We also notice that the difference between natives and first generation immigrants is much larger than the difference between natives and immigrants of the second-generation (all dotted lines).

(Figure 1 about here)

(Figure 2 about here)

Figure 3 and 4 show the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of entering into *cohabitation* by origin for men (Figure 3) and for women (Figure 4). Here, first generation immigrants with Former Yugoslavia, Turkish and with South-European origins, both men and women, enter cohabitation at younger ages than natives. These differences are more evident for women. We can also notice (as for first union formation) that the difference between natives and second generation immigrants is much smaller than the difference between natives and immigrants of the first generation. However, we note that immigrants with Western European origins and their descendants enter cohabitation at older ages than natives.

(Figure 3 about here)

(Figure 4 about here)

Figure 5 and 6 show the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of entering into *marriage* by origin for men (figure 5) and for women (figure 6). The results show that marriages are started at older ages than cohabitations. We can also see in the figures that the differences found for

cohabitation among the first generation immigrants with Former Yugoslavian and Turkish and South-European origins, are even stronger for marriage. In both cases this group enters unions in younger ages than natives. However, different from cohabitation second-generation immigrants with South-European origins experience entrance into marriage later than natives.

(Figure 5 about here)

(Figure 6 about here)

The difference between marriage and cohabitation is partially due to the fact that the different population subgroups enter marriage later than cohabitation. For example, second generation immigrants with Former Yugoslavian and Turkish origins (purple line) enter marriage later than the first generation with the same origin. In a period of rapid transformation of union types, differences in the incidence of cohabitation and marriage are likely to be strongly related to the different age or cohort profile of native and immigrant populations at the time of the survey (Kulu & Gonzalez-Ferrer 2013). For these reasons, birth cohort is one of the main control variables we introduced in our multivariate models (see 3.2). The question is whether we are facing a pure cohort effect or whether differences between immigrant and native will persist after controlling for the year of birth.

### 3.2. Risks of first union formation (cohabitation and marriage) by immigrant origin

For the analyses of first union formation we developed two separate analyses; 1) using the variable "aggregated origins" and 2) "disaggregated origins", and we distinguished between cohabitation and marriage.

Risk of *first union formation* is presented in table 8. By applying the variable "origins aggregated" we noted that there exist a significant different risk of first union formation among (1G and 2G) men and women between immigrants and natives. In model M1, first generation immigrant men have higher risk of first union formation than natives (11%) and second generation immigrant men have a 22% lower risk than natives. For women the results are similar but the risks are lower for the first generation than for natives (5%). If we use the variable "origins disaggregated", we observe that, for both male and female first generation immigrants with Former Yugoslavian and Turkish origins and with Southern European

origins, have a higher risk of entering a first union than natives (1G Former Yugoslavia: 69% for men, 26% for women; 1G Southern European: 48% for men, 31% for women). For second-generation immigrants of any origin and sex, the results show that the risk of entering a first union is lower than for natives. The most significant difference is for the second-generation immigrants with other origins, who have a lower risk of first union formation (38% for men and 32% for women). These results did not change in the second model where the additional control variables were introduced (Table 8, Model 2).

#### (Table 8 about here)

In table 9 we find the risks for entering *cohabitation*. By applying the variable "origins aggregated" we noted that there is a lower risk for entering cohabitation for second generation immigrants than for natives (15% lower for men and 13% lower for women). These patterns persisted when education is also controlled for (model 2). If we use the variable "origins disaggregated", both male and female first generation immigrants with Former Yugoslavian, Turkish or South-European origins, have a higher risk of cohabitation than natives. For second generation immigrants of any origin and sex, the results show that the risk for entering cohabitation is lower than for natives. These results are more significant for the second generation with other origins, which are about 24% lower for men and 30% lower risk of cohabitation for women.

#### (Table 9 about here)

The relative risks of entering marriage by immigrant origin and sex are shown in table 10. By applying the variable "origins aggregated" we noted that first generation immigrant men have 23% a higher risk of entering marriage than natives. We can also see that men and women from second generation immigrant group have a lower risk than natives (13% for men and 19% for women). If we use the variable "origins disaggregated", both male and female first generation immigrants with Former Yugoslavia, Turkish or South-European origins have a higher risk of entering marriage than natives (Former Yugoslavia and Turkey: 72% for men and 31% for women; South-European: 52% for men and 37% for women). For all groups of second generation immigrants the risk of entering marriage is lower than natives, and this trend is strongest for the South-European immigrants who experience 30% lower risk of entering marriage than natives.

## 4. Summary and discussions

This study investigated first union formation (cohabitation and marriage) among immigrants and their descendants in comparison to the native population in Switzerland using data from SHP. First, we found that in Switzerland the median age for men and women at first marriage is higher than the age at first cohabitation, for natives and all immigrants' origins. Our analyses showed significant differences in partnership trajectories across population subgroups. First generation immigrants (men and women) have a higher chance of first union formation (cohabitation and marriage) than natives and these trajectories are more pronounced when we analyse first marriage formation. However, we note that this risk is more explicit for immigrants with origin in Former Yugoslavia, Turkey and Southern Europe. The immigrants with Western European origins have the same risk of first union formation than natives. In contrast, the second generation immigrants have a lower likelihood of union formation (cohabitation and marriage) than natives. This risk is more evident for second generation immigrants with "Other" and Western origin. It should be noted that the coefficients of second generation immigrants with Former Yugoslavian and Turkish origins and immigrants with Southern European origins show similarities with those of the natives.

Following these results, we can conclude that ethnic minorities should not be analysed as a homogenous group in cases like Switzerland, a country with an abundant and complex history of immigration. Another important result is that in Switzerland the differences between natives and second generation immigrants are much smaller than the difference between natives and first generation migration. These results support the major role of the social environment. Socialization in Switzerland from early ages seems to affect the type of first union and the timing of the transition to first union. As remark, we have to take into account that the presented results may be influenced by the fact that for first generation immigrants union formation was analyzed independent if the union formation occurred prior or after migration.

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## Appendix

Table 1. Distribution of individuals by immigration origin, sex and cohort.

	•	S	ex		Bi	rth coho	rt	
	Total	Men	Women	Before	1946-	1961-	1971-	1980+
				1945	1960	1970	1980	
Native	10896	5421	5475	2909	3187	2087	1569	1144
1G Others	481	254	227	93	183	106	46	53
1G Western Europe	251	89	162	105	90	36	16	4
1G Former	172	84	88	5	53	75	33	6
Yugoslavia & Turkey								
1G France	161	51	110	50	61	41	8	1
1G Germany	254	92	162	124	66	52	7	5
1G Italy	377	179	198	112	140	90	31	4
1G Portugal & Spain	140	63	77	9	54	51	21	5
2G Others	946	467	479	72	184	205	230	255
2G Western Europe	319	142	177	56	82	105	68	8
2G Former	113	56	57	3	19	36	43	12
Yugoslavia & Turkey								
2G France	227	94	133	45	53	70	49	10
2G Germany	448	197	251	136	106	151	52	3
2G Italy	602	294	308	100	153	205	113	31
2G Portugal & Spain	144	65	79	8	22	51	54	9
Total	15531	7548	7983	3827	4453	3361	2340	1550

Source: SHP

Table 2. Median age first union formation by immigration origin for men.

		10	1G	1G Former	1G	2G	2G	2G Former	2G
Men	Natives	1G Others	Western	Yugoslavia	Southern	Others	Western	Yugoslavia	Southern
		Others	Europe	& Turkey	Europe	Others	Europe	& Turkey	Europe
Q1	23.90	23.92	24.83	22.45	23.73	22.46	24.17	23.18	23.40
Median	26.63	26.79	28.32	24.87	25.72	25.68	27.11	27.25	26.00
Q3	30.12	31.82	32.37	27.25	29.66	29.71	31.02	29.12	29.61
IC 95% (-)	23.86	24.32	26.09	20.95	23.64	23.51	25.38	21.09	24.08
IC 95% (+)	29.40	29.26	30.55	28.79	27.80	27.85	28.84	33.41	27.92

Source: PSM

Table 3. Median age first union formation by immigration origin for women.

		1G	1G	1G Former	1G	2G	2G	2G Former	2G
Men	Natives	Others	Western	Yugoslavia	Southern	Others	Western	Yugoslavia	Southern
		Others	Europe	& Turkey	Europe	Others	Europe	& Turkey	Europe
Q1	21.52	20.50	22.15	19.25	20.60	20.98	22.30	20.93	21.80
Median	24.24	24.44	24.64	21.25	24.91	24.34	24.73	22.87	23.89
Q3	27.40	27.50	28.79	25.30	27.90	28.47	27.91	25.25	27.83
IC 95% (-)	21.35	21.60	22.92	17.30	22.80	22.21	23.17	17.14	21.98
IC 95% (+)	27.13	27.28	26.36	25.20	27.02	26.47	26.29	28.60	25.80

Source: PSM

Table 4. Median age first union formation (cohabitation) by immigration origin for men.

Men	Natives	1G Others	1G Western Europe	1G Former Yugoslavia & Turkev	1G Southern Europe	2G Others	2G Western Europe	2G Former Yugoslavia & Turkey	2G Southern Europe
Q1	21.88	21.82	21.97	21.34	20.33	22.02	21.92	21.50	21.69
Median	24.67	25.35	26.30	23.56	22.73	24.81	25.60	26.33	24.00
Q3	28.90	29.34	30.41	25.75	25.46	28.26	29.70	28.50	27.42
IC 95% (-)	21.87	22.87	24.07	19.65	20.66	22.63	23.84	20.05	22.05
IC 95% (+)	27.47	27.83	28.53	27.47	24.80	26.99	27.36	32.61	25.95

Source: PSM

Table 5. Median age first union formation (cohabitation) by immigration origin for women.

		16	1G	1G Former	1G	2G	2G	2G Former	2G
Women	Natives	1G Others	Western	Yugoslavia	Southern	Others	Western	Yugoslavia	Southern
		Others	Europe	& Turkey	Europe	Others	Europe	& Turkey	Europe
Q1	19.68	19.77	20.36	18.01	19.43	20.41	20.15	19.90	19.47
Median	22.13	23.14	22.98	19.75	21.53	23.50	22.68	22.80	22.50
Q3	25.10	26.75	26.35	24.40	25.93	27.75	26.16	24.70	25.20
IC 95% (-)	19.02	20.26	21.24	15.73	19.38	21.31	21.10	16.97	20.52
IC 95% (+)	25.24	26.02	24.72	23.77	23.68	25.69	24.26	28.63	24.48

Source: PSM

Table 6. Median age first union formation (marriage) by immigration origin for men.

		1G	1G	1G Former	1G	2G	2G	2G Former	2G
Men	Natives	Others	Western	Yugoslavia	Southern	Others	Western	Yugoslavia	Southern
		Others	Europe	& Turkey	Europe	Others	Europe	& Turkey	Europe
Q1	24.87	24.43	25.70	23.00	23.96	25.21	25.55	27.25	25.10
Median	27.52	27.38	28.73	25.27	26.31	28.00	27.22	28.60	27.43
Q3	30.91	31.45	31.87	27.80	30.21	32.71	32.41	31.16	31.93
IC 95% (-)	24.97	24.74	26.34	20.92	24.05	24.89	25.11	20.99	25.01
IC 95% (+)	30.07	30.02	31.12	29.62	28.57	31.11	29.33	36.21	29.85

Source: PSM

*Table 7. Median age first union formation (marriage) by immigration origin for women.* 

		1G	1G	1G Former	1G	2G	2G	2G Former	2G
Women	Natives	Othors	Western	Yugoslavia	Southern	Others	Western	Yugoslavia	Southern
		Others	Europe	& Turkey	Europe	Others	Europe	& Turkey	Europe
Q1	22.57	21.67	22.63	19.81	20.83	22.33	23.47	21.25	22.89
Median	25.11	25.45	25.18	22.10	23.32	26.40	25.72	24.50	25.82
Q3	28.21	27.86	29.28	25.68	27.53	30.20	28.62	26.87	30.30
IC 95% (-)	22.51	22.27	23.34	17.80	21.06	23.66	23.84	17.48	23.39
IC 95% (+)	27.71	28.63	27.02	26.40	25.58	29.14	27.60	31.52	28.25

Source: PSM




Figure 1. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of entering into first union by origin, men.




Figure 2. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of entering into first union by origin, women.




Figure 3. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of entering into first union (cohabitation) by origin for men.




Figure 4. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of entering into first union (cohabitation) by origin for women.




Figure 5. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of entering into first union (marriage) by origin for men.




Figure 6. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of entering into first union (marriage) by origin for women.

Table 8. Relative risk of first union formation.

	Men	Model 1	95%	IC	Model 2	95%	C Individuals	;
		HR Sig	-	+	HR Sig	-	+ become ur	der risk
	Native	1			1		at age 17	
o n	1G	1.11 **	1.02	1.23	1.14 **	1.04	1.26	
Ę.	2G	0.78 ***	0.72	0.87	0.82 ***	0.73	0.88	
First Union	Women	Model 1			Model 2			
這		HR Sig	5		HR Sig			
	Native	1			1		Censoring	last
	1G	1.05 *	0.96	1.15	1.01 *	0.98	1.18 interview of	rage
	2G	0.76 ***	0.69	0.84	0.77 ***	0.71	0.85 45	
	Men	Model 1	95%	IC	Model 2	95%	C Individuals	
		HR Sig	-	+	HR Sig	-	+ become ur	der risk
	Native	1			1		at age 17	
	1G Others	0.81 **	0.68	0.96	0.85 *	0.72	1.03	
	1G Western Europe	1.03	0.88	1.22	0.98	0.84	1.17	
	1G Former Yugoslavia & Turkey	1.69 ***	1.28	2.23	1.72 ***	1.31	2.27	
	1G Southern Europe	1.48 ***	1.26	1.72	1.58 ***	1.35	1.85	
	2G Others	0.62 ***	0.51	0.73	0.65 ***	0.54	0.79	
	2G Western Europe	0.81 ***	0.71	0.92	0.79 ***	0.69	0.91	
9	2G Former Yugoslavia & Turkey	0.71 *	0.58	1.44	0.96 *	0.61	1.51	
5	2G Southern Europe	0.94 *	0.81	1.11	0.95 *	0.81	1.12	
First Union	Women	Model 1			Model 2			
证		HR Sig	;		HR Sig			
	Native	1			1			
	1G Others	0.75 ***	0.61	0.93	0.77 **	0.63	0.95	
	1G Western Europe	1.03	0.90	1.18	1.07	0.94	1.23	
	1G Former Yugoslavia & Turkey	1.26 ***	0.96	1.65	1.28 **	0.98	1.68	
	1G Southern Europe	1.31 ***	1.12	1.53	1.30 ***	1.11	1.52	
	2G Others	0.66 ***	0.56	0.79	0.68 ***	0.57	0.81	
	2G Western Europe	0.81 ***	0.71	0.92	0.82 ***	0.72	0.94 Censoring	
	2G Former Yugoslavia & Turkey	0.92 *	0.61	1.39	0.94 *	0.62	1.41 interview of	rage
	2G Southern Europe	0.79 ***	0.67	0.93	0.78 ***	0.66	0.92 45	

Signif: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 9. Relative risk of cohabitation.

	Men	Model 1	95%	IC	Model 2	95%	IC	Individuals
		HR Sig	-	+	HR Sig	-	+	become under risk
_	Native	1			1			at age 17
io.	1G	1.09 *	0.99	1.19	1.11 *	1.01	1.21	
it at	2G	0.85 ***	0.79	0.93	0.87 ***	0.81	0.94	
Cohabitation	Women	Model 1			Model 2			
છે		HR Sig			HR Sig			
	Native	1			1			Censoring last
	1G	1.01	0.91	1.09	1.02	0.93	1.11	interview or age
	2G	0.87 ***	0.75	0.88	0.82 ***	0.76	8.89	45
	Men	Model 1	95%	IC	Model 2	95%	IC	Individuals
		HR Sig	-	+	HR Sig	-	+	become under risk
	Native	1			1			at age 17
	1G Others	0.79 ***	0.67	0.94	0.83 **	0.70	0.98	
	1G Western Europe	1.01 *	0.87	1.18	0.97 *	0.83	1.13	
	1G Former Yugoslavia & Turkey	1.52 ***	1.19	1.94	1.56 ***	1.22	1.99	
	1G Southern Europe	1.45 ***	1.25	1.67	1.53 ***	1.33	1.78	
	2G Others	0.76 ***	0.65	0.88	0.80 ***	0.69	0.93	
_	2G Western Europe	0.82 ***	0.72	0.94	0.80 ***	0.71	0.92	
ţį	2G Former Yugoslavia & Turkey	0.97	0.67	1.41	1.02	0.70	1.48	
ita	2G Southern Europe	1.01	0.88	1.16	1.03	0.89	1.18	
Cohabitation	Women	Model 1			Model 2			
ဝိ		HR Sig			HR Sig			
	Native	1			1			
	1G Others	0.75 ***	0.62	0.91	0.76 ***	0.63	0.92	
	1G Western Europe	0.99	0.87	1.12	1.03	0.91	1.17	
	1G Former Yugoslavia & Turkey	1.16 *	0.90	1.50	1.17	0.91	1.52	
	1G Southern Europe	1.21 ***	1.05	1.41	1.20 ***	1.03	1.39	
	2G Others	0.70 ***	0.60	0.81	0.71 ***	0.61	0.83	
	2G Western Europe	0.85 ***	0.76	0.95	0.87 ***	0.77	0.97	Censoring last
	2G Former Yugoslavia & Turkey	0.96	0.67	1.37	0.97	0.68	1.39	interview or age
	2G Southern Europe	0.88 *	0.76	1.01	0.86 *	0.75	0.99	45

Signif: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 10. Relative risk of marriage.

	Men	Model 1	95%	IC	Model 2	95%	IC	Individuals
		HR Sig	-	+	HR Sig	-	+	become under risk
	Native	1			1			at age 17
e,	1G	1.23 **	1.01	1.23	1.25 ***	1.03	1.25	
iag.	2G	0.87 ***	7.16	0.86	0.89 ***	0.72	0.88	
Marriage	Women	Model 1			Model 2			
2		HR Sig			HR Sig			
	Native	1			1			Censoring last
	1G	1.11	0.96	1.15	1.15	0.98	1.18	interview or age
	2G	0.81 ***	0.71	0.84	0.83 ***	0.71	0.85	45
	Men	Model 1			Model 2			Individuals
		HR Sig			HR Sig			become under risk
	Native	1			1			at age 17
	1G Others	0.78 **	0.68	0.97	0.81 **	0.72	1.03	
	1G Western Europe	1.01	0.88	1.22	0.99	0.84	1.17	
	1G Former Yugoslavia & Turkey	1.72 ***	1.29	2.23	1.69 ***	1.31	2.27	
	1G Southern Europe	1.52 ***	1.27	1.73	1.58 ***	1.35	1.85	
	2G Others	0.65 ***	0.51	0.74	0.67 ***	0.54	0.79	
	2G Western Europe	0.87 ***	0.70	0.93	0.82 ***	0.69	0.91	
Đ,	2G Former Yugoslavia & Turkey	0.92	0.58	1.44	0.96	0.61	1.51	
jë.	2G Southern Europe	0.95	0.80	1.10	0.97	0.81	1.12	
Marriage	Women	Model 1			Model 2			
2		HR Sig			HR Sig			
	Native	1.00			1.00			
	1G Others	0.78 ***	0.61	0.93	0.80 ***	0.63	0.95	
	1G Western Europe	1.01	0.90	1.18	1.04 *	0.94	1.23	
	1G Former Yugoslavia & Turkey	1.31 ***	0.96	1.65	1.29 **	0.98	1.68	
	1G Southern Europe	1.37 ***	1.12	1.53	1.35 ***	1.11	1.52	
	2G Others	0.66 ***	0.56	0.79	0.68 ***	0.57	0.81	
	2G Western Europe	0.83 ***	0.71	0.92	0.83 ***	0.72	0.94	Censoring last
	2G Former Yugoslavia & Turkey	0.91	0.61	1.39	0.95	0.62	1.41	interview or age
	2G Southern Europe	0.80 ***	0.67	0.93	0.81 ***	0.66	0.92	45

Signif: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1